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Abstract 
 
In recent years, a growing field of research, known as policy diffusion, has investigated the 
idea that policy choices affect each other across geographic units. However, the distinction 
between direct and indirect diffusion has to a large part been neglected. This thesis adds to the 
policy diffusion literature by distinguishing between direct and indirect diffusion of active 
labor market policy (ALMP). Hence, the analysis also contributes to the research focusing on 
explaining variation in ALMP. Using spatial and multilevel regression methods, the thesis 
investigates causes of diffusion and identifies the most important determinants of the variation 
in ALMP expenditures across 29 OECD countries, between 1985 and 2010. The empirical 
analysis finds evidence to support the argument that the spread of ALMP across countries is 
driven by domestic determinants and common contexts, and not by diffusion of the policy 
itself. Domestic institutional variables are found to be most influential in explaining 
geographic patterns of ALMP, more precisely social democratic welfare regime and 
corporatism. The same variables, in addition to the age of EU membership, are found to be 
responsible for explaining expenditure variation across countries in the period 1985-2010.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Since the mid-1980s the use of active labor market policies (ALMP) have spread among the 
members of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Bonoli 
2010). According to Shin (2000), ALMP has become the most utilized policy option in 
welfare states, because programs such as education, training and recruitment subsidies, 
greatly affect productivity and the skill level of the workforce. Most OECD countries 
substantially increased their ALMP expenditures between 1985 and 1995 (Shin 2000). 
Nevertheless, there is a large disparity on spending on active measures across OECD 
countries (Shin 2000). There are countries that spend more than 1.5 percent (Finland, 
Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden), while others have very low expenditures, under 0.1 
percent of GDP (Czech Republic and Mexico) (OECD.Stat 2011). A few scholars have 
attempted to explain the differences in ALMP expenditures within and between countries 
(e.g., Armingeon 2007; Bonoli 2010; Franzese and Hays 2006; van Vliet and Koster 2011), 
although the largest body of literature on ALMP is centered on evaluating its effects on 
unemployment (see for example Card et al. 2010). This thesis seeks to explain the variation in 
ALMP across 29 OECD countries during the period 1985-2010. Thus, the main research 
question is: What explains the variation in ALMP expenditures across 29 OECD countries 
over the time period 1985-2010? The aim is to identify the most important determinants of 
ALMP, which can explain developments over time, as well as between countries.  
National politicians do not make decisions in a vacuum; they are subject to pressure from a 
range of actors, processes and events, which compromise their autonomy. Decision-making 
autonomy can be defined as freedom from intervention, oversight, and control from external 
actors (Barber and Martin 2001). To understand the pattern of policy variation, it is important 
to examine the factors that influence the autonomy of national politicians in formulating and 
allocating money to ALMP. The constraints to national policy autonomy can be of both 
domestic and international character, as well as economic and political. Thus, the thesis 
identifies four broad categories of determinants (Table 1), and aims to test their relative power 
in explaining ALMP variation. 
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Table 1. Determinants of ALMP 
 Domestic International 
Political 
Left-wing powers, social 
democracy, corporatism 
Spatial policy diffusion 
Political integration: EU 
Economic Macroeconomic indicators Economic globalization 
 
First, the domestic economic constraint is the state of the national economy, which puts limits 
on the welfare budget. This may in turn restrict politicians’ ability to allocate money to 
ALMP. Second, domestic political constraints are national institutional arrangements, such as 
welfare systems and constellations of social partnership, which may restrict political freedom 
in the short run. Third, international economic restrictions on national policy autonomy may 
be the consequences of economic globalization. Finally, policy autonomy may also be 
constrained by international political conditions, such as political pressure from international 
organizations or through policy influence from foreign governments, also known as policy 
diffusion. Within the framework of these four categories the analysis pays special attention to 
the effect of spatial policy diffusion, meaning the spread of policy across borders.  
Scholars studying the variation in ALMP have yet to consider the limitations to policy 
autonomy holistically, and in a comparative perspective. Most previous studies have 
concentrated on one type of constraint, and the topic that has attracted the most attention is the 
role of social democracy (including welfare regime, union strength, social partners and left-
wing politics) in explaining variation in ALMP (e.g., Bonoli 2003;2010; Janoski 1990;1994; 
Jingjing et al. 2008; Martin and Swank 2004; Mosley et al. 1998; Pontusson and Swenson 
1996; Rueda 2006). Further, the impact of international organizations such as the OECD and 
the EU has been of considerable interest (e.g., Armingeon 2007; van Vliet 2010; van Vliet 
and Koster 2011). The research on diffusion processes of ALMP, on the other hand, has been 
very limited. Only a few studies have analyzed ALMP diffusion (e.g., Franzese and Hays 
2006; Kemmerling 2006). Franzese and Hays (2006) study negative diffusion of ALMP, by 
focusing on spillover effects, which encourage countries to free ride off the active measures of 
their neighbors. Kemmerling (2006) takes for granted that positive diffusion of ALMP occurs. 
He looks at ALMP diffusion as the dependent variable and tries to explain why it happens. 
However, the diffusion studies of Franzese and Hays (2006) and Kemmerling (2006) fail to 
distinguish between direct and indirect diffusion of ALMP. In fact, the policy diffusion 
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literature in general, has been unsuccessful in identifying the causes and mechanisms of 
diffusion (Gilardi 2010). By overlooking the differences between direct policy adoption from 
one country to another (direct diffusion), and the spread of policy driven by common political, 
institutional, cultural or linguistic contexts (indirect diffusion), the explanations for why 
diffusion processes occur in the first place are obscured. Therefore, this thesis distinguishes 
clearly between direct and indirect diffusion of ALMP. It provides explanations for why 
indirect diffusion is more likely to cause spatial spreading of ALMP, than direct diffusion. 
The main reasons for this argument is the path dependent nature of ALMP (Armingeon 2007; 
Bonoli 2010) and the differences in institutional arrangements between OECD countries. An 
analysis of policy diffusion requires a defined structure of dependence between countries. 
This analysis tests ALMP diffusion across OECD countries with two different spatial weights: 
geographic proximity and bilateral trade. Previous studies have exclusively relied on 
geographic measures of proximity (i.e., Franzese and Hays 2006; Kemmerling 2006). The use 
of a non-geographic measure in the analysis of ALMP diffusion rests on the assumption that 
the spread of policy does not necessarily depend on geography.  
To summarize, the thesis makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it takes a 
holistic approach to comparing the relative importance of constraints to national policy 
autonomy of ALMP. Second, it adds to the policy diffusion literature by distinguishing 
between direct and indirect diffusion of ALMP, and by testing diffusion using a non-
geographic weight structure.  
The thesis takes a quantitative approach to explaining the variation in ALMP. Both spatial 
analysis and multilevel regression are used to evaluate the effect of policy diffusion and 
explanatory variables. The data material has a panel data structure covering 29 OECD 
countries and annual observations between 1985 and 2010. The choice of method allows for 
distinguishing between direct and indirect types of diffusion, while at the same time 
evaluating and comparing the effects within and between countries of a range of explanatory 
variables.  
To answer the research question, What explains the variation in ALMP expenditures across 
29 OECD countries over the time period 1985-2010?, three sub-questions are formulated. 
These will serve as focal points of the analysis. 
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1. Is there a policy diffusion effect in ALMP? Policy diffusion refers to the process where one 
country’s policy choices are adopted or by another country (Braun and Gilardi 2006; 
Simmons and Elkins 2004). The analysis tests whether there exists a spatial pattern of ALMP 
within the OECD, and aims to find out if spatial patterns are caused by direct diffusion of 
ALMP, or indirectly through diffusion of common political, cultural, institutional or 
economic contexts. Spatial diffusion of ALMP within the OECD is expected because of the 
pressure from the OECD and the EU to activate labor politics (Armingeon 2007; Kluve et al. 
2007), and because of the documented growth in ALMP over the past two and a half decades 
within countries of the OECD (Bonoli 2010).  
2. Which factors are more important in explaining ALMP, domestic or international? It has 
been argued that political and economic globalization has compromised the policy autonomy 
of individual states (Garrett 1998b). De Haan and Plümper (2006) argue that European 
integration reduces policy autonomy of EU member states. Clark et al. (1998: 87) claim that 
the increase in international capital mobility has caused an increase in economic policy 
convergence, “a decrease in the ability of states to effectively regulate behavior, and a threat 
to national sovereignty”. Shin (2000), on the other hand, claims that the constraint placed 
upon the discretion of the nation state caused by globalization, leads to more money being 
allocated to ALMP. Because economic integration drives competition among countries, 
welfare states need to reform their social policies into business friendly policies. Hence, active 
measures are argued to be more market friendly, as they often entail human capital 
investment, in contrast to pacifying benefit transfers (Shin 2000). In other words, international 
contexts can have both positive and negative impacts on ALMP. The focus in this thesis is to 
find out whether national politicians are constrained by international forces to either increase 
or decrease ALMP efforts, and to determine the influence of international factors in relation to 
domestic in explaining variation.  
3. Do economic factors matter more than political factors in explaining ALMP variation? 
Janoski (1994: 59) claims that “political power variables should have a strong and positive 
effect that is greater than socioeconomic variables because ALMP is a discretionary rather 
than automatic policy”. Nevertheless, Lewis-Beck (1977) finds statistical evidence that 
socioeconomic variables are far more important in determining public policy, than political 
variables. Previous research focusing on the effect of political and institutional variables on 
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ALMP (e.g., Janoski 1994; Rueda 2006) are inconclusive. Scholars have found that social 
democratic welfare regimes, left-wing government and corporatism have either no effect at all 
in explaining ALMP variation, while others find negative effects on spending. By comparing 
political variables to economic variables, it is possible to determine whether politics matter at 
all, or if ALMP is an automatic response to the international economy and/or domestic 
macroeconomic indicators. This question seeks to find out to what extent political decisions 
regarding ALMP spending are constrained by economic conditions.  
The thesis has the following structure: The second chapter defines ALMP, explains the 
motivation behind such policies and provides a rough historical background of its use and 
extension. The third chapter is the theory chapter. It starts by defining policy diffusion, 
explains the difference between direct and indirect diffusion, and outlines the mechanisms 
through which diffusion may happen. Then, the theoretical expectations to domestic and 
international determinants, as well as control variables are discussed, and hypotheses are 
developed. The fourth chapter explains the method applied in the analysis. The first part of the 
chapter concerns spatial regression analysis, and the second part explains the principles of 
multilevel panel models. The fifth chapter provides an overview of the data used in the 
analysis, variable operationalization, as well as descriptive statistics and how the weight 
matrices are calculated. In the sixth chapter, model estimations are conducted step by step, 
results are analyzed and a summary of the main findings is presented. Chapter seven discusses 
the results in relation to theory, hypotheses and previous findings. Chapter eight concludes, 
discusses the thesis’ contribution to the literature and points to further research. 
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2.0 Active labor market policies  
Active labor market policies are government interventions to improve the functioning of the 
labor market (OECD 2010). These active measures include job training, employment 
incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation and start-up 
incentives. Passive measures, on the other hand, are limited to benefit transfers, such as 
unemployment benefits and early retirement schemes (OECD 2010). To get a clearer 
understanding of what form ALMP takes in practice, Bonoli (2010: 439-41) suggests to 
distinguish between four main program categories: 1) Incentive reinforcement; 2) 
employment assistance; 3) occupation; and 4) human capital investment. Incentive 
reinforcement refers to initiatives that try to strengthen work incentives for benefit recipients. 
This can be achieved by for example making benefits conditional on work scheme 
participation. Employment assistance refers to measures that aim to remove obstacles to labor 
market participation. Examples of programs include placement services and job-search 
assistance. Parents who lack child-care may also receive help in finding and paying for 
appropriate day-care. The third category, occupation, has the objective of keeping 
unemployed people occupied, where the goal not necessarily is labor market reentry. Through 
job creation and work experience programs in the public or non-profit sector, the fall in 
human capital during periods of high unemployment is prevented. The final category, human 
capital investment (also known as upskilling) refers to vocational training and courses 
designed to make the jobless more attractive for employers. There are great cross-national 
differences in the distribution of the various programs (Bonoli 2010). The first and second 
categories, incentive reinforcement and employment assistance, are most common in English-
speaking countries, but elements also exist in the Nordic countries and continental Europe. 
The third category, occupying the unemployed, has been widely used in continental Europe, 
especially during the 1980s and early 1990s. The Nordic countries rely heavily on the final 
category of human capital investment (Bonoli 2010: 441). The divergences in the use of the 
various programs indicate that language and political culture are influential in determining 
ALMP.  
The concept of ALMP was developed in Sweden by social democrats in the 1950s (Bonoli 
2010). In the period between the end of the Second World War and the mid-1970s, Sweden is 
described as a pioneer of labor market policy, “introducing a unique kind of labor market 
policy that other countries could only stand back and admire” (Toft 2003: 569). The 
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introduction of the Rehn-Meidner model in the Swedish macroeconomy marked the invention 
of active labor market policies (Janoski and Hicks 1994). The Rehn-Meidner model (Meidner 
1948; Rehn 1948), that was developed by two Swedish trade union economists, recommends 
selective employment policy combined with tight macroeconomic policy and solidary wage 
policy, to ensure full employment and economic growth while avoiding problems of inflation.  
The OECD started exploring the qualities of ALMP as early as 1964 (Kemmerling 2006). 
Throughout the 1970s ALMP was implemented in a number of industrialized countries, a 
development mainly driven by left-wing governments (Janoski and Hicks 1994). In 1992 the 
labor ministers of the OECD endorsed an official framework for labor market policies. The 
framework emphasized the urgent need to shift public spending from passive to active 
measures (Shin 2000). ALMP was again strongly advocated by the 1994 OECD Jobs Study, 
which highlighted the positive virtues of active measures: improving access to labor markets, 
promoting more efficient labor markets, strengthening links between growth of aggregate 
demand, job creation and the supply of qualified labor (OECD 1994: 36). For the same 
reasons, ALMP became an important part of the European Employment Strategy in 1997 
(Franzese and Hays 2006; Kluve et al. 2007). Through an “open method of coordination” the 
EU continues to promote the activation of labor market policies (Kluve et al. 2007). Although 
ALMP is a product of the political left, it has now been accepted by liberals, conservatives 
and liberal economists, because of its market enabling effects and macroeconomic benefits 
(Armingeon 2007). 
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3.0 Theory and hypotheses  
The third chapter presents the theoretical framework of the analysis. Theory is necessary to 
justify the expectation of a policy diffusion effect in ALMP, as well as the choice of 
independent variables. This chapter presents theoretical arguments for how the four categories 
of constraints to policy autonomy – domestic political, domestic economic, international 
political and international economic – are expected to influence the variation in ALMP. A 
total of 14 hypotheses are formulated about the relationship between explanatory variables 
and ALMP variation. 
The chapter is structured as follows: First, policy diffusion is defined and the differences 
between direct and indirect diffusion are clarified. Six mechanisms of diffusion are presented 
and their relevance for ALMP diffusion is discussed. Further, the different structures of 
dependence between countries, is theorized. The second part of the chapter presents theory on 
domestic political determinants of ALMP variation. The domestic economic determinants are 
considered to be control variables, which are reviewed toward the end of the chapter. The 
third section concentrates on presenting theory on international explanations for ALMP 
variation. Both political integration through the EU and economic globalization are discussed. 
Finally, expectations to control variables are presented, before a brief summary of the theory 
chapter is provided.  
3.1 Policy diffusion and Galton’s problem 
It is reasonable to expect policy diffusion of ALMP among OECD countries for several 
reasons. First, the OECD started emphasizing activation of labor market policies as early as 
1964 (Kemmerling 2006: 158), and has since encouraged member countries to increase 
ALMP efforts. The work of the OECD rests upon the principles of scientific rationality and 
validity. It is an intergovernmental organization promoting policy best practices based on the 
assumption that knowledge matters in the development of national policies (Armingeon 
2007). Although the OECD does not have the power to impose policies on member countries, 
it provides an arena for communication and the exchange of experiences, which encourages 
diffusion of policy among member countries (Kemmerling 2006). Secondly, Bonoli (2010) 
suggests that the mere fact that ALMP have increased across OECD countries during the last 
couple of decades indicates that some form of policy diffusion has taken place. This may not 
be the case, but the expectation to spatial diffusion of ALMP is fair.  
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In recent years, the idea that policy choices affect each other across geographic units has 
gained increased interest from scholars of comparative politics (Gilardi 2010). The fact that 
governments influence each other’s policy-making has been known for a long time, but was 
until recently treated as a problem, also known as Galton’s problem1, because this so-called 
spatial autocorrelation complicated the empirical analyses. It was seen as a nuisance that had 
to be controlled for (Braun and Gilardi 2006). 
Now a growing literature on policy diffusion is putting the “problem” in the center of 
attention and is exploring the characteristics and consequences of patterns of similar policy-
making across states and countries. A central goal is to model and explain Galton’s problem, 
rather than control it (e.g., Beck et al. 2006; Braun and Gilardi 2006; Franzese and Hays 
2008; Hays et al. 2009; Kemmerling 2006; Meseguer and Gilardi 2008; Meseguer and Gilardi 
2009; Simmons and Elkins 2004; van Vliet 2010). Recent research has provided evidence of 
policy diffusion and improved operationalization of diffusion mechanisms (Gilardi 2010). 
However, Braun and Gilardi (2006) criticize the diffusion literature for being weak and 
theoretically incoherent, because literature on various diffusion mechanisms lack a common 
theoretical basis. Braun and Gilardi (2006) review the literature and develop a common 
framework of theoretical determinants of diffusion processes. Before presenting this 
framework covering six mechanisms of diffusion, it is necessary to discuss how diffusion is 
defined in the literature, and how it is used in this thesis.  
The literature defines policy diffusion both as policy-making interdependence, and as the 
spatial spreading of similar policies driven by domestic or exogenous external variables. This 
distinction has been given slightly different labels. Simmons and Elkins (2004) distinguish 
diffusion processes from diffusion outcomes. Franzese and Hays (2008) distinguish between 
interdependence and diffusion, while Braun and Gilardi (2006) draw a line between diffusion 
and spurious diffusion. Essentially, they all agree on the differences between the two types of 
diffusion. Diffusion-like patterns may exist without interdependence in decision-making. 
Interdependence is evident when values on the dependent variable in one unit, directly affect 
values on the dependent variable in other units. Diffusion, however, may also refer to patterns 
of outcomes (i.e., values on the dependent variable) across spatial units. These patterns must 
not depend on outcomes affecting each other directly, but may be driven by correlations in 
                                                 
1
 See for example Walker (1969) and Gray (1973).  
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domestic or exogenous international determinants (Franzese and Hays 2006: 771-72). In other 
words, policy makers in different countries may end up choosing the same policies 
independently of each other, as reactions to the same needs. The spread of the same policies 
may therefore not be caused by direct diffusion of a policy itself, but by diffusion of domestic 
determinants or common contexts
2
 (Braun and Gilardi 2006). One example is the 
globalization of economic liberalization. Simmons and Elkins (2004) theorize that 
liberalization patterns, which tend to cluster in time and space, could be reactions to 
international phenomena (e.g., currency crisis and economic recession), instead of 
interdependent policy-making. Liberalization may also just be the number one choice for 
liberal democracies, resulting in diffusion-like patterns, but which in reality are independent, 
but similar reactions to the same circumstances. Such processes are not classified as diffusion 
by Simmons and Elkins (2004). 
In this thesis both types of diffusion, i.e., policy-making interdependence and spurious 
diffusion, are of interest. To avoid concept confusion the two types will hereafter be called 
direct and indirect diffusion, respectively. There are two reasons for considering both types. 
First, a central part of the analysis is to find out if there is evidence of spatial patterns in 
ALMP, caused by either type. And if so, to test whether domestic and exogenous international 
variables can account for this pattern. If independent variables explain spatial patterns of 
ALMP, we are dealing with indirect diffusion. If the opposite is the case, it is evidence of 
direct diffusion. Second, spatial diffusion researchers have found that policy interdependence 
matters alongside, or in interaction with, other internal and external determinants (Braun and 
Gilardi 2006; Collier and Messick 1975; Simmons and Elkins 2004). Thus, it is probable that 
direct diffusion of outcome exists alongside diffusion of common contexts.  
Mechanisms of policy diffusion 
The driving force in the policy diffusion literature is the interest in the mechanisms causing 
policy diffusion. When aiming to identify diffusion of a certain policy, and distinguishing 
between the direct and indirect type, it is useful to understand how and why diffusion 
processes occur at all. Therefore, a range of diffusion mechanisms is presented below. 
                                                 
2
 See also Berry and Berry (1990), Collier and Messick (1975) and Van den Bulte and Lilien (2001). 
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If direct policy diffusion is defined as government A’s behavior influencing government B’s 
behavior (i.e., interdependence), then the mechanism of diffusion is “a systematic set of 
statements that provide a plausible account of why the behavior of A influences B” (Braun 
and Gilardi 2006: 299). Simmons and Elkins (2004) distinguish between two types of direct 
diffusion mechanisms: altering payoffs and learning. Payoffs of governments are altered when 
policy decisions of one government change the costs and benefits of neighboring countries’ 
policies. One example where payoffs are altered is when country A increases ALMP efforts 
and the increase leads to a decrease in unemployment in an area shared by country A and 
country B. This situation creates incentives for country B to free ride on the ALMP efforts 
made by country A. For instance, unemployed in Belgium can travel to France to participate 
in training programs and then return to Belgium more employable (Franzese and Hays 2006). 
Learning, on the other hand, may take place when governments face a situation where the 
appropriate policy is lacking, and they turn to their neighbors for policy advice (Armingeon 
2007).  
Braun and Gilardi (2006) aim at developing a theoretically consistent framework of diffusion 
mechanisms. The framework considers altering payoffs and the effectiveness of policy, but it 
does not explicitly distinguish between direct and indirect diffusion mechanisms. Braun and 
Gilardi (2006) consider six types of mechanisms: 1) learning, 2) competitive and cooperative 
interdependence, 3) coercion, 4) common norms, 5) taken-for-grantedness, and 6) symbolic 
imitation. According to definitions of direct and indirect diffusion, the first two mechanisms 
refer to direct diffusion, because actions of one government directly affect other governments. 
Number three and four, coercion and common norms, describe indirect diffusion processes, 
while the latter two can be mechanisms of both direct and indirect diffusion.  
Learning is defined as “the acquisition of new relevant information that permits the updating 
of beliefs about the effects of a new policy” (Meseguer 2004; 2005, in Braun and Gilardi 
2006: 306). New information can come either from prior decisions and experiences, or from 
the experiences of others. From a rational choice perspective actors choose policies depending 
on effectiveness, which they learn about from others (Meseguer 2006). However, learning is 
not useful in evaluating policy payoff. Braun and Gilardi (2006) take as example privatization 
of the telecommunication industry. Privatization may render greater payoffs than public 
monopolies in one country, while strong trade unions may cause monopolies to be more 
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valuable than privatization in others. They emphasize that payoffs matter in interaction with 
effectiveness, thus making the utility of policy change dependent on both payoffs and 
effectiveness. In contrast, Meseguer (2006) assigns payoffs to the error term making it 
additive to effectiveness. Thus, he expects policy change as soon as one of the elements is 
greater than the other, while Braun and Gilardi (2006) in their model expect actors to choose 
less effective policies when evidence is weighted with positive payoffs.  
Competitive and cooperative interdependence is the second mechanism of Braun and 
Gilardi’s framework. This can be described as a prisoner’s dilemma type situation – 
cooperation may make everyone better off, but the temptation to prioritize one’s own needs is 
constant (Lazer 2001, in Braun and Gilardi 2006). Competitive interdependence rests on the 
assumption that governments aim to attract economic activity and act strategically to achieve 
it (Simmons and Elkins 2004). For example, the lowering of taxes by one country creates 
incentives for neighboring countries to do the same. In contrast, cooperative interdependence 
deals with compatibility. In many cases, such as international standards, commercial law and 
accounting, and international regulation of financial markets, it is effective for countries to 
cooperate and harmonize. Regarding competitive and cooperative interdependence, Braun and 
Gilardi (2006) argue that policy choices depend only on effectiveness, and not on payoffs. 
They use the example of taxation; higher taxation leads to greater payoffs, but at the same 
time it encourages investors to move their money to countries with lower tax levels. Thus, 
total tax revenue is reduced, and external policy-making has altered the effectiveness of 
domestic policy.  
Coercion is the third mechanism of diffusion and refers to the pressure from international 
organizations to implement recommended policy (Braun and Gilardi 2006). Organizations 
like the EU, IMF and the World Bank do this to a lesser or greater extent using both carrots 
and sticks. Coercion is strictly speaking a mechanism of indirect diffusion, because it does not 
describe the influence of one country’s policy on neighboring countries’ policy choices, but 
the influence from an external institution upon one or more countries. Coercion can only be 
perceived as a mechanism of direct diffusion if one country uses economic or other sanctions 
to threaten a neighbor country to implement, or refrain from implementing, certain policies. In 
the case of ALMP, interstate coercion is not very likely. 
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Common norms is the fourth mechanism of policy diffusion. Through interactions in networks 
and organizations countries develop common norms and values. Braun and Gilardi (2006) 
transfer this process to policy, and claim that actors under common norms develop the same 
views on effectiveness of policy, and therefore, choose the same policies. The mechanism of 
common norms is also one of indirect diffusion, because it does not describe a process where 
countries are directly influenced by each other’s policies. Instead, it explains how common 
underlying factors might drive governments to choose the same policies.  
The fifth mechanism is what Braun and Gilardi (2006) have named taken-for-grantedness. 
This mechanism is based on the belief that over time some practices and policies become the 
natural way of doing things; actors automatically assign them high effectiveness and 
alternatives are no longer considered. In spite of politics being characterized by diverging 
views, some examples of diffusion through taken-for-grantedness can be found: e.g., women’s 
suffrage rights and abolition of slavery (Braun and Gilardi 2006). Taken-for-grantedness is 
both a direct and indirect diffusion mechanism. First, countries need to influence each other 
directly to start a process. Then, a large number of countries need to have implemented the 
policy for it to be perceived as taken for granted. The second step is more of a common 
norms-type mechanism because it reflects a collective subscription to the same values.  
Symbolic imitation is the sixth mechanism, which concerns the spread of policies that are 
perceived as socially valued practices. An example of symbolic imitation is granting 
independence to central banks (McNamara 2002). The practice of delegation sends a strong 
symbolic message that the government is doing the right thing, and it serves as legitimization 
in times of economic stress (Braun and Gilardi 2006). Symbolic imitation may also be of both 
direct and indirect character. Countries might look to each other to decide on the best 
practices, but they might also decide according to a more abstract international policy trend. 
The six mechanisms of policy diffusion explained above – learning, competitive and 
cooperative interdependence, coercion, common norms, taken-for-grantedness and symbolic 
imitation – explain the causes of the spread of policy across national borders. When applied to 
diffusion of ALMP across OECD countries, some mechanisms are theoretically more 
plausible than others. This thesis argues that learning is the most relevant mechanism 
describing direct diffusion of ALMP, but also competitive and cooperative interdependence 
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may occur. In addition, coercion may have an impact on diffusion, but only indirectly through 
international organizations. 
Learning is essentially the acquisition of new information about what works and what does 
not. The process of learning therefore requires communication between countries. The OECD 
is an organization that was established for precisely the purpose of communicating the best 
policies to its member countries, motivated by its slogan “Better policies for better lives” 
(OECD 2013). Drawing from member country experiences, the OECD especially encourages 
ALMP efforts through actively communicating its virtues (Armingeon 2007). According to 
Bonoli (2010: 438) “learning seems the most adequate to account for the success of ALMPs”. 
However, diffusion of ALMP can also be influenced by the mechanism of competitive 
interaction. If ALMP is perceived as a costly welfare benefit that requires a certain tax level, 
countries may compete in a social race to the bottom where expenditures for active measures 
are cut to attract foreign capital. The third, and least likely mechanism, coercion may 
contribute to indirect diffusion of ALMP, for example through sanction-threatened EU 
pressure to activate labor market policies.  
It is less likely that diffusion is due to mechanisms of common norms, taken-for-grantedness 
or symbolic imitation. Common norms are unlikely to cause ALMP diffusion within the 
OECD, because OECD countries are too politically and culturally diverse. Many evaluations 
of ALMP effectiveness are inconclusive (Card et al. 2010), and perceptions across 
governments are divergent. For the same reasons, taken-for-grantedness, is not a probable 
cause of diffusion. ALMP is too young a phenomenon and it is not perceived as the only sane 
response to unemployment. ALMP implementation through symbolic imitation is not likely, 
due to the high costs of these programs. However, one case where symbolic imitation of 
ALMP is probable is as a strategic action to please the EU. New member states or pending 
applicants could be expected to increase their ALMP efforts to earn goodwill from the EU, 
given that activation is encouraged through the European Employment Strategy (Franzese and 
Hays 2006). However, this mechanism is rather one of coercion (i.e., policy pressure from the 
EU), than of symbolic imitation.  
Is it relevant to expect ALMP diffusion across OECD countries at all? There are two reasons 
why the answer to this question is positive. First, both the EU, through the European 
Employment Strategy, and the OECD strongly advocate increased ALMP efforts. Although 
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these recommendations are not legally binding, it is nevertheless reasonable to expect that 
they have had an impact (i.e., caused a diffusion process through learning, coercion, and 
cooperative and competitive interaction). Second, there is strong evidence that ALMP efforts 
have increased and spread across the OECD during the last couple of decades (Bonoli 2010). 
Thus, there is good reason to believe that the growth in ALMP has resulted in some diffusion-
like pattern (i.e., diffusion of outcome). A hypothesis regarding diffusion of ALMP can be 
formulated. 
H1: Policy diffusion is a determinant of ALMP variation 
To test whether a diffusion-like pattern exists, it is essential to define what constitutes a 
pattern. The field of geography commonly uses common borders or border length between 
two countries to define spatial relationships. The use of geographic proximity is justified by 
Tobler’s (1970: 235) first law of geography: “Everything is related to everything else, but 
near things are more related than distant things”. However, distance does not necessarily 
mean geographic distance. In political science a range of other measures of proximity are 
possible, depending on research question. Beck et al. (2006) mention, among others, common 
language and colonial history. Others have used migration flows (Figlio et al. 1999) and 
bilateral trade relationships (Lebreton and Roi 2009). In this analysis, both bilateral trade and 
common borders are used to define spatial relationships between countries. The following 
section discusses the choice of weight matrices when studying diffusion of ALMP. 
Defining the structure of dependence 
Almost without exception, the few spatial analyses that have been conducted with ALMP as 
the dependent variable have used geographic measures of proximity (i.e., neighbor dummy 
and/or border length) (e.g., Franzese and Hays 2006; Kemmerling 2006). However, spatial 
analysis must not define space as geographic distance or Euclidean distance (Beck et al. 
2006); space can also be economic or political in its nature (Lee and Yu 2010). Ward and 
Gleditsch (2008) suggest average travel time, number of mobile phone conversations, amount 
of tourism, or amount of commerce between each region, as plausible metrics of distance. 
Geographic proximity is not necessarily the number one choice of spatial weight, because it 
can only confirm or reject spatial diffusion, but not explain why. In other words, geographic 
weighting can lead to spurious causality, by for example showing that countries closer 
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together influence each other stronger, when in fact the actual cause of diffusion is not 
geography per se, but common political, cultural, linguistic, or historical contexts. 
Therefore, this analysis uses both geographic proximity and bilateral trade flows to define 
distance between countries. It is useful to first test the presence of diffusion based on the 
simplest neighbor/non-neighbor matrix, to find out if there exists a spatial correlation in 
ALMP at all. However, the cases included in the analysis are geographically dispersed across 
the world, with heavy concentration in Europe. It is likely that evidence of spatial diffusion 
based on neighborhood is not an effect of policy interdependence between governments, but 
for example an effect of policy diffusion through the EU. A measure that provides more 
information on the cause of diffusion is bilateral trade. Trade flows describe the economic 
proximity of two countries (Ward and Gleditsch 2008), irrelevant of geographic distance. 
Countries with strong trade relations can be expected to align their industrial and labor 
policies to facilitate business and prevent political embargoes (Garrett 1995). According to 
Beck et al. (2006: 33) “[…] countries tend to be more dependent or influenced by their major 
trading partners, where the bilateral trade flows are large relative to a country’s total trade”. 
When using two different dependence structures, it is important to keep in mind that diffusion 
patterns will also look different on the map. This means that trade relationships cannot be 
used to explain geographic diffusion patterns.  
As pointed out by a number of scholars (e.g., Collier and Messick 1975; Simmons and Elkins 
2004), direct policy diffusion, i.e., interdependence, does not act in isolation. There will 
necessarily be domestic and external variables that explain part of the variation in ALMP. The 
following sections will theoretically outline potential influences of ALMP determinants, 
domestic and international, political and economic, as well as certain interaction effects. 
Hypotheses describing causal relationships between determinants and ALMP will be 
developed.  
3.2 Domestic explanations for ALMP efforts  
To formulate hypotheses about the impact of domestic factors in constraining policy 
autonomy of ALMP, it is important to consider theoretical expectations to both political and 
economic domestic variables. This section concentrates on theory of the domestic political 
determinants left-wing government, corporatism and social democratic welfare state, while 
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domestic economic variables are discussed under control variables in the final section of the 
chapter.  
Left-wing government 
In comparative politics, it is a common assumption that the party in government matters for 
policy and policy outcome (Garrett and Lange 1991), and that parties of the left and right have 
diverging preferences concerning social spending (Alvarez et al. 1991). Haan and Sturm 
(1994) theorize that government spending as a share of total output tends to be higher in 
countries with left-wing governments. Most scholars agree that the relationship between left-
powers and ALMP is likely to be positive, because the idea of ALMP was conceived in a 
social democratic environment (Bonoli 2010), with the acceptance of state intervention in the 
market (Armingeon 2007). Thus, history and theory suggest a divergence in support for 
ALMP across the political right-left scale, where left-wing parties are the most likely to 
support such policies (Armingeon 2007; Bonoli 2010; Janoski and Hicks 1994; Jingjing et al. 
2008). This view is challenged by Rueda (2007a) who suggests that the social democrats are 
split in their relationship to ALMP. Rueda distinguishes between insiders and outsiders with 
respect to the labor market, and argues that ALMP is a disadvantage to the insiders, because 
such policies tend to reinforce competition, which again leads to downward pressure on 
wages. Politicians in power are more likely to serve insiders, rather than outsiders, because 
insiders are generally better organized and more likely to reward politicians through voting 
(Bonoli 2010; Rueda 2007a). Although theories are contradicting a positive effect of left-wing 
governments on ALMP is expected, but the hypothesis is tested two-tailed.  
H2: Left-wing governments have a positive effect on ALMP efforts  
Corporatism 
Corporatism is defined as “the cooperation between the state and the organizations of capital 
and labor in the formulation and implementation of public policy” (Lehmbruch 1984; Marks 
1986, in O'Connel 1994: 221). Institutions of corporatism are concerned with wage 
bargaining, labor policies and labor market regulation (Franzese 2002). One measure of 
corporatism is trade union density, another is degree of centralized wage bargaining 
(Kenworthy 2000; Visser 2011).  
18 
 
A number of scholars have analyzed the effect of corporatism on labor market policy outcome 
(e.g., Janoski 1990;1994; Martin and Swank 2004; Mosley et al. 1998; O'Connel 1994; 
Pontusson and Swenson 1996; Rueda 2007b). The common assumption is that corporatism 
correlates positively with ALMP, because strong trade unions are expected to work for the 
benefit of those on the rim of the labor market. Bonoli and Emmenegger (2010) emphasize 
the role of social trust among unions and employers as a means for success of ALMP and 
other employment policies.  
However, Rueda’s (2007a) insider-outsider model takes a two-fold approach to the role of 
corporatism in influencing employment policies. First, the model relies on the premise that 
unions have no interest in serving anyone but their employed members: the insiders. He 
argues that ALMP does not benefit the insiders, because such policies tend to reinforce 
competition, by bringing unemployed back to work, which causes downward pressure on 
wages. Hence, unions are not in favor of ALMP. The second approach hypothesizes that 
unions with large constituencies are more concerned with the performance of the economy as 
a whole, and thus do support ALMP (Rueda 2007a). Union density is a measure of union 
members in percent of total employed labor force. When using this measure of corporatism, 
Rueda’s (1997) second hypothesis is most fitting, as high union density implies larger unions 
or more unions with the interest of securing efficient labor markets and general economic 
growth. Hence, the following hypothesis is developed. 
H3: Union density has a positive effect on ALMP efforts 
Corporatism and left-wing governments are not isolated phenomena. Rueda (2006), Garrett 
(1998a) and Alvarez et al. (1991) all study the influence of the interaction between strong 
unions and left-wing governments. Alvarez et al. (1991) argue that the ability of the left to 
pursue its desired policies depends on the political institutions in a country – in particular the 
labor movement. The stronger the labor movement, the greater is the capacity of a left-wing 
government to implement desired policies. Hence, a hypothesis describing the interaction 
effect of corporatism and left-wing governments is formulated: 
H4: Left-wing government given corporatism has a positive effect on ALMP efforts  
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Social democratic welfare regime 
Different welfare regimes may differ on the level of ALMP effort, even after controlling for 
the political orientation of the government (Armingeon 2007). Because welfare states are 
results of long historical processes, there will be regime-specific predispositions toward 
ALMP, which are independent of changing political power distributions (Armingeon 2007; 
Esping-Andersen 1990). According to Esping-Andersen (1990), emphasis on ALMP is one of 
the defining features of the social democratic welfare state found in the Nordic countries, 
which necessarily makes it positively correlated to ALMP. Also, activation strategies were 
introduced in the Nordic countries during periods of public expansion, which provided 
favorable conditions for the institutionalization of ALMP. In contrast, ALMP was not 
initiated in the continental and Anglo-Saxon countries until the mid-1980s. These were times 
of fiscal discipline, which made the introduction of ALMP more difficult (Armingeon 2007; 
Bonoli 2007). However, there are scholars who view ALMP as a compromise between social 
democracy and liberalism, who challenge the argument that social democratic regimes are 
more favorable to ALMP (Bonoli 2010; Rueda 2007b). They argue that through ALMP, 
social democratic regimes are able to pursue their objectives without harming the interests of 
capital. Shin (2000) claims that ALMP is market friendly, because it entails upskilling the 
labor force, which is a good thing for capitalists and for the market. This means that countries 
with liberal welfare regimes are just as likely to pursue ALMP. Because theories are 
diverging, social democratic welfare regime as a determinant of ALMP is included in this 
analysis. The following hypothesis is formulated:  
H5: Social democratic welfare regime has an effect on ALMP efforts  
3.3 International explanations for ALMP efforts  
So far five hypotheses have been developed, describing the expectation to policy diffusion 
and the relationship between domestic political variables and ALMP. The topic of this section 
is the international dimension of constraints to policy autonomy. In addition to spatial policy 
diffusion of ALMP, the literature identifies a number of international variables. In the 
following paragraphs the expected effects of political integration, exposure to trade and 
international business cycles are presented.  
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Political integration: The European Union 
Just like economic integration of markets, political integration can impact domestic decision-
making. Supranational organizations like the EU can impose policy directives on member 
states
3
. Although initiatives to coordinate employment objectives started already in the early 
1990s, the EU did not officially encourage the development of ALMP until the launch of the 
European Employment Strategy at the Luxembourg Jobs Summit in 1997 (Kluve et al. 2007). 
Through the mechanism of “open method of coordination”, which relies on voluntary policy 
implementation by EU member states, activation of labor market policies are supposed to 
improve social inclusion and contribute to converging labor markets. However, when it comes 
to the implementation of ALMP, the EU, although supranational, wields only soft power over 
national politicians (Armingeon 2007). Nevertheless, van Vliet (2010) claims that EU 
countries converge on active measures as a direct cause of the emphasis on activation in the 
European Employment Strategy. Armingeon (2007) argues that the EU can be a successful 
ALMP broker when allowing national politicians to implement labor market policies that are 
designed to respond to local needs. Further, he theorizes that established EU countries are 
more likely to implement ALMP, compared to younger members, because ALMPs are 
complex welfare policies, which require a certain level of functioning welfare institutions. 
Based on the European Employment Strategy’s activation recommendations and Armingeon’s 
(2007) assumption regarding old and new members, the following effects of EU membership 
are expected. 
H6: EU membership has a positive effect on ALMP efforts 
H7: Age of EU membership has a positive effect on ALMP efforts  
Economic globalization  
The literature indicates two competing theories regarding the relationship between social 
welfare spending and economic globalization: 1) the efficiency hypothesis, and 2) the 
compensation hypothesis (Dreher et al. 2008). The efficiency hypothesis implies that large 
                                                 
3
 Policy impact of international organizations is not to be confused with direct policy diffusion, which describes 
policy impact of one country upon another. However, EU membership is only one effect on ALMP alongside 
processes driven by policy diffusion mechanisms, such as strategic action and spillover effects. For details, see 
Franzese and Hays (2006).  
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social expenditures are an impediment to international competitiveness, and that trade 
liberalization leads to budgetary pressure, which restrains governments’ fiscal policies. On the 
opposite, the compensation hypothesis predicts that globalization may change the preferences 
and/or needs of the Downsian median voter (see Downs 1957), and consequently the political 
incentives to expand the welfare budget (Armingeon 2007; Dreher et al. 2008; Leibrecht et al. 
2011). Public welfare expansion may be necessary to protect the workforce from the 
volatilities of an unpredictable world market (Armingeon 2007; Cameron 1978; Katzenstein 
1985). Katzenstein (1985) claims that open economies are more willing to use active policies 
to compensate for open market vulnerabilities. Although they contradict each other, the 
efficiency and compensation hypotheses may cycle each other, through a mechanism where 
liberalization leads to greater needs for social protection, whereupon reduced international 
competitiveness calls for less domestic spending (Dreher et al. 2008). Hence, a hypothesis 
regarding the general relationship between economic globalization and ALMP is formulated. 
H8: Economic globalization has an effect on ALMP efforts  
To be more specific with regard to the effect of economic globalization on ALMP, this thesis 
looks closer at three elements of economic globalization: exposure to trade and international 
business cycles. 
Exposure to trade 
One of the most widely held beliefs about the globalization of markets is that it has substantially 
decreased the autonomy of the nation-state, resulting in a “race to the bottom” whereby 
governments competing for mobile economic resources race to dismantle their welfare states 
(Garrett 1998b: 71-72). 
Garrett (1998b) analyzes the mechanisms at work between national governments and the 
international economy, and argues both theoretically and empirically, that increased exposure 
to trade is not as constraining on national autonomy as commonly believed. First, trade is 
believed to compete with the welfare state. Welfare provisions are expensive and need to be 
financed either by taxes or by borrowing. Higher taxation reduces international 
competitiveness, and increases the cost of doing business. Borrowing, on the other hand, leads 
to inflation and higher interest rates, which reduces investment. The theory of reducing 
taxation and government spending to increase international competitiveness is also known as 
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“the social race to the bottom” (Castles 2004). Garrett (1998b) and Pierson (1996), however, 
argue that the welfare state is too popular among OECD countries, that government responses 
to changes in competitiveness are slow, and that there is no reason to expect swift changes to 
established domestic institutions. Rodrik (1998) too, disagrees with conventional wisdom and 
believes in a positive correlation between an economy’s exposure to trade and the size of 
government: “The correlation holds for most measures of government spending, in low- as 
well as high-income samples, and is robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls” 
(Rodrik 1998: 997). He explains the positive relationship with the fact that government 
spending is risk-reducing when an economy is exposed to external risk. Hence, the “race to 
the bottom”-theory is rejected. However, Garrett (1998b) acknowledges that globalization 
correlates with diverging national economic policies, depending on domestic institutions. 
Especially, political party in power and strength of labor movement are influential on a 
government’s reaction to economic openness. Based on the theories and arguments presented 
above, three hypotheses are formulated. 
H9: Exposure to trade has an effect on ALMP efforts 
H10: Exposure to trade given left-wing government has a positive effect on ALMP efforts 
H11: Exposure to trade given strong unions has a positive effect on ALMP efforts 
International business cycles 
Is there a world business cycle? Do international business flows have the same effect on all 
countries? According to Kose et al. (2003), recent studies have shown that there are common 
links in macroeconomic fluctuations between countries. “[…] international financial flows 
have roughly similar effects on similarly situated countries” (Clark et al. 1998: 87). Thus, it is 
plausible to assume that international business cycles affect OECD countries somewhat 
similarly, because OECD countries are roughly similar in terms of economic development. 
Given the above, it is possible to hypothesize how business cycles impact ALMP efforts. 
Whether the effect is positive or negative follows the logic of efficiency versus compensation 
explained above (Janoski 1994). Therefore, a two-tailed hypothesis is developed.  
H12: International business cycles have an effect on ALMP efforts 
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Next, it is logical to assume that the effect of international fluctuations is stronger for 
countries with a more open economy. The following hypothesis is formulated, describing the 
interaction between business cycles and trade exposure. 
H13: The effect of international business cycles on ALMP efforts increases with exposure to 
trade 
3.4 Control variables 
In addition to the hypothesized relationships above, there are certain variables that are of less 
substantial interest in the analysis, but nevertheless need to be controlled for. These are 
national unemployment, GDP per capita, growth and inflation.  
Because ALMPs are developed to improve the labor market and help people back to work 
(OECD 2010), national unemployment is expected to have a positive effect on ALMP 
(Armingeon 2007; Janoski 1994). In quantitative studies of ALMP, the unemployment rate is 
often already accounted for in the operationalization of the ALMP variable (e.g., Armingeon 
2007; Scarpetta 1996; van Vliet and Koster 2011). However, in order to distinguish between 
national and international effects of unemployment, both national and international 
unemployment rates are added as separate control variables in the empirical analysis. GDP 
per capita is also included as a control variable because of the expectation that more 
economically developed countries generally have higher social expenditures and more 
extensive protection systems (van Vliet and Koster 2011). Therefore a positive relationship 
between GDP per capita and ALMP is assumed. Further, it is essential to control for national 
business cycle effects, such as growth and inflation, when modeling ALMP variation 
(Franzese 2002; Janoski 1994). Janoski (1994) distinguishes between counter- and pro-
cyclical theories of government spending. In the counter-cyclical model, governments are 
expected to tighten the belt during periods of growth, and increase spending during 
recessions. Pro-cyclical theories indicate the opposite, that slow growth and economic 
recession constrains governments from spending. Janoski (1994) supports the Keynesian type 
model due to the fact that ALMP is explicitly formulated as a counter-cyclical policy. 
Leibrecht et al. (2011) also argue in line with the Keynesian counter-cyclical model, that the 
need for protection policies like ALMP is lower during periods of high growth. Hence, 
negative relationships between growth and ALMP, and GDP and ALMP, are expected. The 
operationalization of ALMP in this analysis enforces these negative relationships. Because 
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ALMP expenditure is measured as a percentage of GDP, ALMP declines when GDP 
increases, even if budgets are not cut.  
Janoski (1994) argues that inflation should be positively correlated to ALMP, because 
inflation is an economic problem which spending can correct. However, this is a much too 
simplistic assumption. High inflation rates reflect the erosion of the purchasing power of 
money, and by increasing government spending, the supply of money in the economy will 
increase, and thus the value of money will continue to fall (Cleaver 2004; Steigum 2004). 
Hence, inflation can have either a positive or a negative effect on ALMP efforts.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning four variables that have been included in similar ALMP studies 
previously, but which are omitted from this analysis due to lack of data, lack of convincing 
theoretical justification and lack of significant results in previous studies. The omitted 
variables are national debt
4
 (e.g., Leibrecht et al. 2011; van Vliet and Koster 2011), political 
business cycles (PBC)
5
 (e.g., Mechtel and Potrafke 2011), female labor force participation
6
 
and economic shocks
7
 (e.g., Janoski 1994).  
                                                 
4
 National debt rates are often associated with public spending cuts, because they entail higher interest rates, 
which again constrain a government’s economic room to maneuver (Leibrecht et al. 2011; Sanz and Velázquez 
2007). On the other hand, debt might lead to increased spending in an attempt to stimulate economic growth 
(Leibrecht et al. 2011). However, previous analyses (e.g., Leibrecht et al. 2011; van Vliet and Koster 2011) have 
not found robust effects of debt on public welfare spending.  
5
 The theory of PBC (Nordhaus 1975) suggests that incumbent politicians seek votes preceding elections through 
expansive macroeconomic policy. However. Clark et al. (1998) argue that “existing cross-national examinations 
of PBC arguments are fundamentally flawed because they fail to consider the constraining influence of 
institutions, both domestic and international”. They find that the open economy combined with cross-national 
differences in institutional arrangements cause the PBC assumption to break down. 
6
 According to Janoski (1994), variation in female labor force participation strongly influences governments’ 
ALMP expenditures. “ALMP should increase because employed men want insurance against competition in the 
labor market, and women want fairness at work and access to jobs” (Janoski 1994: 59). This argument rests on 
the assumption that men and women have essentially different preferences just because they differ in gender. 
This is a prejudicial, sexist and far-fetched assumption. Janoski (1994) also fails to present any direct significant 
evidence of a relationship between female labor market participation and ALMP.  
7
 A sudden negative shock might cause increased unemployment, which leads to a rise in ALMP expenditures. 
However, Janoski (1994) finds only weak effects of the first (1973) and second (1979) oil price shocks in West-
Germany, Sweden and the USA. Also, ALMP is like other policies of its type, a case of political inertia, meaning 
changes do not happen abrupt and suddenly (Armingeon 2007; Pierson 2004). For these reasons, this analysis 
does not take oil price shocks or other shocks to the economy into account.  
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3.5 Summary 
The third chapter has provided an overview of the theoretical expectations to a range of 
determinants of ALMP, and hypotheses have been developed. First, spatial policy diffusion of 
ALMP was defined, a distinction was drawn between direct and indirect diffusion, and the 
various mechanisms through which diffusion processes operate were discussed with relevance 
to ALMP. Second, theory of the domestic determinants of ALMP left-wing government, 
corporatism and social democratic welfare state was presented. The third part of the chapter 
discussed theoretical expectations to international variables, more specifically the EU, 
economic globalization, exposure to trade and international business cycles. Finally, various 
control variables and omitted variables were mentioned.  
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4.0 Methodology 
This study takes a quantitative approach to determining the degree of spatial dependence in 
ALMP, aiming to distinguish between direct and indirect diffusion, and to identify predictors 
of ALMP variation. The methods chapter has the following structure: First, the principles of 
spatial regression analysis are presented, which include explaining how weight matrices are 
defined, how Moran’s I statistics are used, as well as the idea behind the international ALMP 
variable. In the second part of the chapter, the method of multilevel regression is presented, 
the choice of estimation strategy is explained, and parameters for evaluating model goodness-
of-fit are discussed. Finally, the method for testing and interpreting interactive hypotheses is 
described, before a quick summary of the chapter is provided.  
4.1 Spatial analysis 
Quantitative spatial analysis is a method, which allows social science researchers to test and 
model Tobler’s first law of geography, which predicts that near things are more related than 
distant things (Tobler 1970: 235). This section explains the quantitative method of spatial 
analysis, describes various ways in which spatial dependence can be detected, and 
distinguishes between spatial lag and spatial error regression models. 
Statistical modeling of spatial diffusion processes in the social sciences was up until the last 
couple of decades restricted to geography; some fields of econometrics, such as urban and 
environmental studies; and sociological network studies (Franzese and Hays 2008). However, 
statistical spatial analysis is becoming a growing field of interest within political science 
(Ward and Gleditsch 2008), with special attention directed toward intergovernmental 
diffusion of policy and institutions (Franzese and Hays 2008). Nevertheless, most researchers 
of political science still have a tendency to ignore the spatial effect, or treat it as a nuisance 
(Ward and Gleditsch 2008).  
Ignoring these dependencies imposes a substantial price on our ability to generate meaningful 
inferences about the processes we study. Spatial analysis provides one way of reducing that 
price and taking advantage of the information we have about how social processes are 
interconnected. (Ward and Gleditsch 2008: 3) 
By overlooking spatial dependencies in the data, empirical analyses also tend to overestimate 
the effects of non-spatial predictors, thus favoring theories of variables not sensitive to the 
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spatial effects (Franzese and Hays 2008). In this thesis the spatial analysis will be conducted 
by first observing the level of spatial correlation in ALMP and independent variables, using 
Moran’s I statistics. Second, cross-section spatial regression models are fitted. Third, a 
multilevel panel model will be estimated to examine the effects of domestic, international, 
economic and political determinants of ALMP. Finally, the residuals of the multilevel model 
will be tested for spatial correlation. In theory, it is possible to fit a spatial lag model using 
panel data. However, estimating models with both temporal and spatial dependencies is 
challenging
8
 (Ward and Gleditsch 2008: 86). Hence, the spatial panel data is avoided in this 
thesis, to simplify estimation procedures, to exploit all available information in the panel data, 
and to distinguish the spatial from the temporal correlations.  
Among several types of spatial regression models, the two most common are the spatially 
lagged dependent variable model and the spatial error model (Ward and Gleditsch 2008). In 
this analysis, both types of models will be applied to distinguish between direct and indirect 
diffusion. The first spatial regression model is a model where values on the dependent 
variable directly affect values on the dependent variable of neighboring countries (Ward and 
Gleditsch 2008). In the case of ALMP, this would theoretically mean that ALMP efforts in 
Denmark directly affect ALMP efforts in Germany, given that Denmark and Germany are 
defined as “neighbors”. Considering theories of policy diffusion, the spatially lagged 
dependent variable model is suited to test the theory of direct policy diffusion, also known as 
policy interdependence. The second type of spatial regression model is the spatial error 
model, where the spatial dependency is in the errors, instead of in the outcome variable. This 
model is suitable if one does not assume direct interdependence on the dependent variable 
between neighbors. In the spatial error model, spatial dependency is often viewed as a 
nuisance, comparable to how serial correlation is typically treated: as an estimation problem 
(Ward and Gleditsch 2008: 65). However, spatial error models can provide valuable 
information, namely that some unspecified factors or contexts are causing a pattern of spatial 
                                                 
8
 One way of modeling both dependencies is to add a temporally lagged dependent variable, which, however, 
seriously complicates the residual error structures. According to Beck et al. (2006), so far no one has come up 
with a good enough estimator for the spatial panel model. If one can justify the assumption that first-order spatial 
effects enter with a one period time lag, the model can be estimated using OLS (Ward and Gleditsch 2008). The 
con of this model is that the temporal lag is likely to suck up the effect of the spatial lag. This is because a lagged 
dependent variable will already account for any prior spatial effects. Thus the spatial effect, which may be strong 
in the absence of a temporal lag, will seem marginal when the temporally lagged dependent variable is present 
(Beck et al. 2006). 
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dependence in the errors. It can in other words confirm or reject theories of indirect diffusion. 
What it cannot do is explain why the spatial dependency exists. Both types of models require 
a definition of distance between units, which is specified in the model through the inclusion of 
a weight matrix (Drukker 2009).  
Weight matrices  
To be able to model ALMP diffusion across countries, it is necessary to define the 
relationship between countries. A weight or connectivity matrix is an NxN matrix, which 
defines the structure of dependence between the observed units (Beck et al. 2006). In this case 
N is the number of countries included in the analysis. The weight matrix is not estimated, but 
known to the researcher and units are by convention not related to themselves, which means 
that the matrix diagonal will always be zero (Beck et al. 2006). It is common to row-
normalize the weight matrix (Ward and Gleditsch 2008). If the matrix is binary, each row 
sums to one, so that ”…the net effect of connected observations is the same for all 
observations and that each individual neighbor has a relative weight proportional to one over 
the total number of connected observations” (Beck et al. 2006: 29). If the matrix is non-
binary, each connection is divided by the row sum, to give the individual neighbor weight 
relative to total weight of neighbors.  
This analysis uses two different spatial weight matrices. The first is based on bilateral trade, 
and the second is a binary (0/1) matrix based on shared country borders. Both matrices are 
row-normalized. The binary shared-border matrix assigns equal weight to all neighbors, while 
the trade matrix puts heavier weight on larger trading partners proportional to a country’s total 
trade (Beck et al. 2006: 33).  
Moran’s I  
Moran’s I is a measure of spatial correlation between units on a specific variable. -1 indicates 
negative dependence, 0 a random dispersion (independence), and +1 positive spatial 
dependency (Haining 2003: 75-80). The Moran’s I is calculated by cross-multiplying “a 
measure of spatial proximity with a measure of the similarity of values on some particular 
attribute” (Ward and Gleditsch 2008: 14), where spatial proximity is defined by a weight 
matrix. Moran’s I is useful in detecting direct spatial diffusion in a single variable, and even 
more useful as a diagnostic tool. By estimating Moran’s I for the residuals of a model 
including a spatially dependent y variable, it is possible to determine if independent variables 
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can account for the spatial dependence in y, and how much remains to be explained (Ward 
and Gleditsch 2008). As part of the spatial analysis of ALMP, Moran’s I statistics are 
estimated for all relevant variables, as well as for the residuals of the final multilevel model. If 
a significant Moran’s I is found for the dependent variable, but not in the residuals, the panel 
model has successfully explained all spatial dependence in the outcome variable. If this is the 
case, the Moran’s I values of the independent variables can indicate the variables causing 
spatial diffusion.  
Policy variable: International ALMP efforts  
Because the spatial regression models and the Moran’s I statistics are estimated using cross-
section data, and not the full panel data, there is a huge amount of information not being 
exploited. In order to test spatial dependency using all available data, a policy variable is 
included as an independent variable in the multilevel regression model. The policy variable is 
a measure of the average ALMP spending of all foreign countries. In practice this means that 
for e.g., Germany, the international ALMP value in a given year will be the aggregated 
average of the ALMP efforts of all other countries in the data set, excluding Germany’s own 
efforts. A Wald test of this variable’s coefficient will show whether international ALMP 
levels significantly influence domestic ALMP levels. Note that this variable only measures 
external policy influence – insensitive to specific dependence structures.  
4.2 Panel data as multilevel: Years nested within countries 
In addition to testing hypotheses on spatial policy diffusion of ALMP, this thesis aims to 
identify determinants of variation in ALMP. For this purpose a multilevel random effects 
(RE) model estimated by maximum likelihood is applied to panel data. The structure of the 
data is interpreted as two-level with annual observations nested in countries (Hox 2010: 98). 
The multilevel model with random intercepts and slopes, including a cross-level interaction, is 
given by the following set of equations: 
Level 1: 

Yij  0 j 1 jX j eij  
Level 2: 

0 j   00  01Z j  u0 j  
  

1 j  10 11Z j  u1 j  
The first level equation looks like a normal OLS model, however, the subscripts i and j 
indicate the multilevel structure, where i represents annual observations (level one) and j 
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represents countries (level two). A separate level-one model is estimated for every country, 
which are combined in the multilevel model. The 

0 j  term shows that the average ALMP 
effort is different from country to country, while 

1 j  shows that the effects of independent 
variables vary across countries (Luke 2004: 10). When combining the first and second level 
equations, the multilevel model equation is given by: 

Yij   00 10Xij  01Z j 11Z jXij  u1 jXij  u0 j eij  

00 is the value of the level-one dependent variable ALMP, when all explanatory variables are 
zero. The term 

10X ij  represents the time-varying level-one variables, and 

01Z j  the time-
invariant level-two variable. 

11Z jX ij  is the cross-level interaction term, and 

u1 jX ij  is the 
country-level residuals of the random slopes. A multilevel model will always have one 
residual term for each level. 

u0 j  is the country-level residual term and 

eij  is the residual term 
for annual observations (Hox 2010; Luke 2004: 10-14). 
Maximum likelihood is the typical method when estimating multilevel regressions (Hox 2010: 
257). Maximum likelihood estimation is an iterative procedure, which maximizes the 
probability of the model parameters given the data observed (Hox 2010: 40). In large samples, 
statisticians prefer maximum likelihood estimation over other methods for three reasons: 1) 
estimates are unbiased and consistent; 2) sampling distributions are almost normally 
distributed; and 3) estimates are efficient, meaning that standard errors are generally smaller 
than those of estimates produced by other methods (Singer and Willett 2003: 65). For these 
reasons, maximum likelihood estimates are relatively robust, even in cases where model 
assumptions do not always hold (Hox 2010: 40). The RE multilevel model approach to panel 
data is advantageous to simple OLS for several reasons. First, the RE model allows for 
inclusion of both time-varying (within-country effects) and time-constant variables (between-
country effects). In a fixed effects (FE) model this would not be possible, because the fixed 
effects control for all between-country variation. Second, the RE method allows for modeling 
both random intercepts and random slopes, which can reflect that effects differ in both level 
and strength respectively, between countries (Allison 2009). Third, random models are better 
equipped to handle data sets with missing data (Hox 2010: 98-99). Fourth, multilevel models 
can handle unbalanced panels (Hox 2010: 79). The data set used in this analysis includes 
some former USSR satellite states, which lack data before 1990/1991. Fifth, by using a 
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multilevel approach to panel data, one does not have to assume that observations within 
countries are independent and can take advantage of all available information. Therefore one 
avoids running the risk of modeling observations that duplicate each other, giving the 
impression that the number of observations is larger than what is actually true (Steenbergen 
and Jones 2002: 219). Simple OLS estimation would violate the assumption of independent 
residuals and result in too small standard errors (Luke 2004: 21-23). 
Building the multilevel model 
The multilevel models are built after the bottom-up principle. This is the typical approach 
(Luke 2004) and implies starting with the simplest model, the intercept-only model, 
progressively adding variables, while continuously watching standard errors, p-values and 
residual variances at the distinct levels. The bottom-up approach is the opposite of starting out 
with a maximum number of parameters, which are stripped down to the model of best fit (Hox 
2010: 56). The advantages of the bottom-up procedure is that one avoids computational 
difficulties due to complex and oversized models, and it is easier to stick to the principle of 
parsimony (Luke 2004). Because fixed parameters are usually more precise than random 
parameters (Hox 2010: 56), the fixed effects are added first, followed by random components. 
In the estimation process the following logic and order is exercised. First, the null model is 
estimated, including only the dependent variable. Second, domestic time-varying (level one) 
variables are added. Third, international time-varying variables are added. Fourth, time-
invariant determinants (level two) are added. Coefficients that prove to be insignificant are 
excluded successively. Fifth, interaction terms are added to test the conditional hypotheses 
H4, H10, H11 and H13. Sixth, the effects of various random slopes are tested on a one-by-one 
basis. In the final model, cross-level interaction effects are added.  
All models include 527 observations and 29 countries. By keeping the number of observations 
and groups constant the models are more easily comparable (Hox 2010: 50). To evaluate 
goodness-of-fit and to compare models, both deviance (Luke 2004: 34) (for nested models) 
and information criteria (Singer and Willett 2003) (for non-nested models) are used.  
All models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for homoscedasticity (Hox 
2010: 260-61), and a first-order autoregressive residuals structure to control for 
autocorrelation (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). In a first-order autoregressive model, the 
residuals of year t are regressed on the residuals of the previous year t-1 (Rabe-Hesketh and 
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Skrondal 2012: 308). In models with a fixed intercept, the correlations between the residuals 
will approach zero as time-lags increase (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 309). However, 
in the case of ALMP, unobserved country specific characteristics are expected to affect the 
dependent variable, therefore intercepts are allowed to vary between countries in all 
multilevel models of the analysis. This produces a random intercepts model with first-order 
autoregressive level-one residuals, where correlations between residuals at various lags are 
not expected to approach zero, no matter how large the lags become (Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2012: 316-17).  
Goodness-of-fit and model comparison 
The typical R
2
-value for evaluating goodness-of-fit of a model is complicated and not very 
useful in comparing multilevel models. First, the R
2
 value is distinct for every level in the 
model; second, adding variables to the model may result in lower, or even negative, values of 
R
2
; and third, it is not possible to interpret R
2
 as a proportion of explained variance, like it is 
done in a typical OLS regression
 
(Luke 2004). There are meaningful ways to calculate 
interpretable R
2
 results for every level (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008: 103; Snijders and 
Bosker 1999). This thesis, however, will stick to two alternatives, which are more 
straightforward than, and just as good as, R
2
: deviance and information criteria. The 
goodness-of-fit of multilevel maximum likelihood models is best evaluated using likelihood 
statistics. Deviance (-2*log-likelihood) is a measure of how good a model fits the data; the 
smaller the deviance, the better the model (Luke 2004; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 
323). The deviance cannot be interpreted alone, but can be used to compare nested models 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2010: 359). The formal likelihood-ratio test (LR-test), which is a 
significance test of the change in deviance between two nested models, is especially useful in 
determining the significance of random variance components (Hox 2010: 48; Rabe-Hesketh 
and Skrondal 2008). However, the disadvantage of the deviance statistic is that it will 
decrease as parameters are added to the model. Hence, it will favor more complex models, 
and therefore violates the principle of parsimony (Luke 2004: 34; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
2012: 323). To make up for the disadvantages of the deviance statistic, Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) (Akaike 1998) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz 1978) 
are useful. Information criterion statistics are based on the log-likelihood (LL) parameter but 
decreases the LL statistics through respective penalties. The AIC penalty is based upon the 
number of parameters in the model (-2lnL+2k, where k is number of parameters), and the BIC 
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penalty is even stricter and takes sample size into account, in addition to the number of 
parameters (-2lnL+klnN, where N is sample size) (Cameron and Trivedi 2010: 359). Both AIC 
and BIC require the use of exactly the same dataset (Singer and Willett 2003: 120-22). AIC 
and BIC can also be used to compare non-nested models (Cameron and Trivedi 2010: 359; 
Luke 2004).  
A second test to compare non-nested models is the Davidson-MacKinnon test, also known as 
the J-test (Davidson and MacKinnon 1981). This test is used to answer research questions 2. 
Which factors are more important in explaining ALMP, domestic or international?; and 3. Do 
economic factors matter more than political factors in explaining ALMP variation? The J-test 
compares two non-nested models by including the fitted values of the first model as a 
coefficient in the second model, and vice versa. If the fitted values provide an improvement to 
either model, it does not include the right set of predictors. Following the multilevel model 
estimations, another four multilevel models will be fitted: 1) domestic variables only; 2) 
international variables only; 3) political variables only; and 4) economic variables only. The 
domestic model will include the fitted values of the international model, and vice versa; the 
political model will include the fitted values of the economic model, and vice versa. The 
coefficients and t-tests of the fitted values in the four models will be analyzed to determine 
the relative strength of the variable groups.  
Modeling interactive hypotheses 
Several of the hypotheses formulated in chapter three are conditional hypotheses, which 
means that they describe relationships between X and Y, where the effect of X depends on the 
values of a third variable Z (Kam and Franzese 2007). According to Brambor et al. (2006: 
64), “analysts should include interaction terms whenever they have conditional hypotheses”. 
Therefore, interaction terms are used to test the following hypotheses:  
H4: Left-wing government given corporatism has a positive effect on ALMP efforts 
H10: Exposure to trade given left-wing government has a positive effect on ALMP efforts 
H11: Exposure to trade given strong unions has a positive effect on ALMP efforts 
H13: The effect of international business cycles on ALMP efforts increases with exposure to 
trade 
34 
 
When including an interaction term, XZ, in a regression model it is important to also include 
both constitutive variables, X and Z, even if these are not significant. Failure to do so may 
result in biased estimates (Brambor et al. 2006). The coefficients of the constitutive variables 
are not to be interpreted as direct, unconditional or main effects (Brambor et al. 2006; Kam 
and Franzese 2007: 20). The constitutive terms show only the effect of a one-unit change in X 
on Y when Z is zero, and vice versa. These coefficients make no meaningful sense when X=0 
or Z=0 are unobserved in the sample. The only way to test the unconditional effect of X and Z 
on Y is to run a model without the interaction term (Brambor et al. 2006: 72). However, it 
makes little sense to analyze the unconditional effect of a variable, if the same variable is part 
of a conditional hypothesis (Brambor et al. 2006: 73). This is because if an interaction effect 
is found to be significant and to contribute toward a better model fit, then a model without the 
interaction will be a misspecification of the relationships between X, Z and Y. To make 
substantively meaningful sense of an interaction term and its constitutive variables, it is 
necessary to calculate marginal effects of the independent variables, and to show the 
uncertainties to which they are calculated (Brambor et al. 2006). In the multilevel analysis of 
ALMP, marginal effects and confidence intervals are calculated and displayed graphically for 
both intra-level and cross-level interactions.  
4.3 Summary 
Chapter four has discussed the method used in the empirical analysis. First, the principles of 
spatial regression analysis were explained, including the idea behind weight matrices, 
Moran’s I statistics, and the intention behind the policy variable. The second part of this 
chapter explained multilevel regression analysis, presented the model estimation strategy, 
discussed various model statistics for evaluating goodness-of-fit, and provided a quick 
explanation of how interaction terms are interpreted.  
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5.0 Data and variables 
An overview of the data in the analysis is useful to understand the scope of the study and to 
demonstrate that variables correspond to theory. The data chapter explains how the dependent 
and independent variables are operationalized, provides selected descriptive statistics and 
goes through the principles of the weight matrices.  
5.1 Data overview 
The analysis uses panel data of 29 OECD countries
9
 over a 26-year period between 1985 and 
2010. There are some missing values
10
, for example pre-1991 for the former USSR satellite 
states. However, balanced panels are not a requirement in multilevel random effects models 
(Allison 2009). All multilevel models are estimated using the exact same data set. In the 
calculations of Moran’s I values, and in the spatial regression models, cross-section data is 
used. Then, the panel data is collapsed to produce a cross-sectional data set reflecting the 
average of the total time period. The time period from 1985 to 2010 is chosen not only 
because of data availability. It was in the mid-1980s when ALMP first became popular 
outside the Nordic countries, and most OECD countries have since increased spending on 
active labor market measures (Shin 2000).  
The selection of cases is limited to OECD members by the availability of ALMP data. The 
OECD has collected active labor market policy data, on a range of different programs, since 
1985 for member countries (Grubb and Puymoyen 2008). Limiting the scope of comparison 
to advanced industrialized countries also limits diversity (Ebbinghaus 1998). All countries are 
advanced economies and participate on global markets.  
To ensure accuracy of estimates of the variance components, a sufficient number of clusters 
are necessary. For multilevel models with random effects Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008: 
                                                 
9
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK and USA.  
10
 Multiple imputations (MI) (Rubin 2004) is an option for dealing with missing values. This is a procedure, 
which simulates a range of plausible values for each missing value. MI is not used in this analysis because it 
would complicate an already complex estimation procedure, and because multilevel models are well-equipped to 
handle missing values (Allison 2009).  
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62) recommend “typically more than 10-20”. The multilevel regressions in this analysis, 
includes 29 countries, which meets the recommended threshold with a comfortable margin.  
5.2 Variable operationalization 
The data set used in the analysis is compiled using a number of different sources and 
databases. Table 2 below provides the complete overview of the variables, how they are 
operationalized, their sources and expected effects.  
Table 2. Variable operationalization, sources and expectations 
Variable Operationalization Source Expectation 
almp 
Active labor market policy 
expenditures, % GDP 
OECD Endogenous  
leftgov 
Chief executive or party orientation: 
left, dummy 
Database of political 
institutions 
+ 
uniondens 
Wage earning union members of total 
wage earners, % 
OECD + 
socdemws Social democratic welfare state, dummy Esping-Andersen, 1990 +/- 
eu EU membership, dummy EU  + 
euage 
Age of EU membership, number of 
years since entry 
EU + 
trade Trade, % of GDP World Bank +/- 
gdpintl 
International mean GDP/cap minus 
country GDP/cap, constant 2000 USD 
World Bank +/- 
almpintl 
International average ALMP/GDP 
minus country specific ALMP 
OECD +/- 
unempintl International average unemployment World Bank + 
unempt-1 Unemployment, % of total labor force World Bank + 
gdpcap GDP per capita, constant 200 USD World Bank + 
growth GDP growth, annual % World Bank - 
inflation GDP deflator, annual % World Bank +/- 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, active labor market policies, is measured as government expenditures 
in percent of GDP (Grubb and Puymoyen 2008). This is the most common measure of ALMP 
(van Vliet and Koster 2011). There are other measures of ALMP, such as number of 
participants in the various programs, but data is limited. There are two reasons for 
operationalizing ALMP as spending in percent of GDP. The first advantage is that it 
corresponds to economic explanatory variables, and eases interpretation of the results. The 
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second reason is that the main interest of this study is to examine policy-making in terms of 
factors that lead politicians to say yes or no to ALMP; factors that lead politicians to allocate 
money for activation purposes. This study is not concerned with how successful programs 
have been in engaging and involving the unemployed. A few previous quantitative studies of 
ALMP have calculated ALMP as a function of the general unemployment rate, arguing that 
the need for ALMP is proportional to the number of unemployed people (Armingeon 2007; 
Scarpetta 1996; van Vliet 2010). Several scholars have used ALMP as a function of total 
LMP efforts, including passive labor market policies, i.e., unemployment benefits and early 
retirement transfers (Armingeon 2007; Kemmerling 2006; van Vliet and Koster 2011). The 
argument for taking passive labor market policies into account, when analyzing variation in 
active policies, is that two countries may spend just as much on labor market policies in total, 
but while one country puts heavy emphasis on activation, the other may rely almost 
exclusively on passive transfers (Armingeon 2007). In the following analysis, ALMP is 
measured as a share of GDP, without taking unemployment or passive labor market policies 
into account. When unemployment is included in the dependent variable, one has to assume 
that the influence of unemployment is constant over time and across countries, and it is 
impossible to examine the actual effect of unemployment. Instead unemployment is 
controlled for by including independent variables of national and international unemployment. 
Passive labor market policies are not considered, simply because total LMP efforts and the 
ratio between active and passive measures are of no interest in this thesis.  
Data on the dependent variable ALMP is collected from OECD’s statistics database 
(OECD.Stat 2011). The time-series is a combination of both OECD statistics and data 
collected by Eurostat. OECD collected consistent data for member countries on labor market 
programs both for expenditures and number of participants, between 1985 and 2002. In 1998 
Eurostat started collecting the same data for Eurostat countries, but following a somewhat 
different classification system. After a while OECD adopted the Eurostat system, which 
avoids the double collection of data for the common OECD and Eurostat countries. To allow 
long time series analysis of data from both regimes, statisticians at OECD performed a 
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complex procedure resulting in comparable values running from 1985 to current data
11
 
(Grubb and Puymoyen 2008). 
Independent variables  
Left-wing government  
To test the effect of ideology, a dummy variable for left-wing government is included. The 
variable has the value one for chief executives or major government parties that are defined as 
communist, socialist, social democratic or left-wing, and the value zero for all other parties 
(Keefer 2012).  
Trade union density 
The effect of corporatism is operationalized as trade union density, which is the ratio of wage 
and salary earners that are trade union members, divided by the total number of wage and 
salary earners (OECD Labour Force Statistics). The variable is calculated using survey data, 
wherever possible, and administrative data adjusted for non-active and self-employed 
members otherwise (OECD.Stat 2010). Trade union density is only one measure of 
corporatism, others include degree of centralized bargaining, right to strike, number of 
effective unions, among many others (Kenworthy 2000; Visser 2011). Kenworthy (2000) 
distinguishes between indicators of centralization and concentration. When choosing which 
measurement to use, Kenworthy (2000) recommends selecting the one most appropriate to 
test theory and hypothesis. Union density is an indicator of concentration, and it is chosen 
because it is the best measure to test Rueda’s insider-outsider model described in 3.2. The 
insider-outsider model concerns first and foremost the relationship between the unions and 
their members, and the preferences of the unions. The relationship between the unions and the 
organizations of employers is of less importance (Rueda 2006).  
Social democratic welfare state 
Social democratic welfare state is a dummy variable corresponding to Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990) classification of welfare state types. Countries classified as social democratic welfare 
states have the value one, all others have the value zero. The variable is time-invariant – no 
countries change to or from the social democratic welfare type throughout the time period 
                                                 
11
 The procedure is thoroughly documented in the working paper “Long time series for public expenditures on 
labour market programmes” (Grubb and Puymoyen 2008). 
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1985-2010. The countries in the sample defined as social democratic welfare states are 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden – the Nordic countries – which implies that the 
variable is spatially clustered.  
European Union 
The effect of the European Union on ALMP is measured by two variables. The first is a 
dummy variable with the value one for EU members and zero for non-members. The second 
is an integer trend variable, which starts with the value one in the year of EU entry, and 
increases with one unit for every year of membership. E.g., Denmark who became a member 
in 1973 has the value 23 in the year 1995. Non-members have the value zero. The trend 
variable is supposed to capture the difference in the effect of the EU between young and old 
members, in order to test Armingeon’s (2007) theory that EU pressure to activate labor 
market policies will have a stronger effect among older EU members.  
Trade 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP 
(World Bank 2013b). The trade volume in relation to GDP is an indicator of how important 
trade is to a country’s economy. The more a country is exposed to trade, the more open its 
economy, and the more vulnerable it is to fluctuations in the international economy. 
International business cycles 
According to Madhani (2010: 181), “the business cycle is the upward and downward 
movements of levels of GDP”. To measure the effect of international business cycles, GDP 
per capita data (World Bank 2013a) is recoded into an international GDP variable. Annual 
means across all countries in the sample are calculated, excluding country wise GDP per 
capita. I.e., values for Australia do not include Australian GDP per capita, values for Austria 
exclude Austrian GDP per capita. This calculation method is used to isolate the domestic 
effect from the international effect
12
. For a definition of what is included in the GDP term, see 
the variable description for GDP per capita below. The GDP data are in constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars.  
                                                 
12
 The same argument applies to the calculation of international ALMP and international unemployment. 
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International ALMP 
The intention behind the international ALMP variable is to test if  international levels of 
ALMP influence domestic policy makers. The variable is recoded from the dependent 
variable, calculating annual means for all foreign countries. This implies that for example for 
Japan, the international ALMP values do not involve Japanese ALMP values. The variable 
can be considered a policy diffusion variable, because it captures the influence of other 
countries’ policies on domestic policies. However, the international ALMP variable does not 
distinguish between neighbors or structures of dependence among neighboring countries. It 
simply reflects the average of all foreign countries’ ALMP in the sample.  
Unemployment 
Two variables of unemployment are used in the analysis: domestic and international. The data 
is collected from the International Labour Organization, but made available by the World 
Bank (2011b). Unemployment is measured as the share of the labor force, which is without 
work, but seeking work. The domestic unemployment variable is lagged with one year, 
because it is expected that governments are unable to react immediately to sudden changes in 
unemployment. The international unemployment variable is recoded using the domestic 
unemployment variable, calculating mean values across countries for every year, not 
including country specific unemployment. In other words, the variable measures the average 
unemployment rate between all foreign countries of a given country.  
GDP per capita  
For the GDP per capita variable, the gross domestic product is divided by midyear population. 
GDP is the total gross value contributed by all resident producers in the economy in addition 
to any product taxes minus subsidies not included in the value of the products. No deductions 
are made for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. The variable is measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars (World Bank 2013a).  
Growth 
The growth variable is the annual percentage growth of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency. The GDP values are calculated just like GDP per capita above (World 
Bank 2012). 
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Inflation 
The inflation variable is operationalized as annual growth in the GDP deflator. It is the rate of 
price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local 
currency to GDP in constant local currency (World Bank 2011a). Another measure of 
inflation is the annual growth of consumer prices compared to a fixed average. The GDP 
deflator is chosen because the data availability is better. However, the two measures are in 
tandem.  
5.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 below displays descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. A 
brief run through of the descriptive statistics will ease the interpretation of the coefficients in 
the spatial and multilevel regression models. N in the last column shows the total number of 
non-missing observations of the variables, n indicates the number of countries for which there 
are non-missing values, and T-bar is the, per country, average number of years for which 
there are valid values. The dependent variable ALMP has an overall mean of 0.68, which 
means that the average share of GDP directed toward ALMP in a given country in a given 
year is seven percent. The standard deviation (SD) is 0.49, and the values range between 0.01 
(Mexico in 2006/2007) and 3.04 (Sweden in 1992). The variation in ALMP is greater between 
countries, than over time within the same country, which is shown by the standard deviations 
of 0.44 and 0.21, respectively. This corresponds to theories of path dependence, which 
hypothesize that policies (and institutions) are phenomena that change and evolve slowly over 
time, because political decisions depend on, and are restrained by, previous decisions (Pierson 
2004). The fact that ALMP is path dependent also implies that it fulfills the assumption of 
stationarity. A stationary process is one of which statistical properties do not change over time 
– its mean and variation are constant (Nason 2006).  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable   Mean SD Min Max N/n/T-bar 
almp overall 0.683 0.493 0.010 3.040 614 
 between  0.441 0.020 1.805 29 
 within  0.213 -0.282 1.918 21.17 
leftgov overall 0.460 0.499 0 1 718 
 between  0.275 0 1 29 
 within  0.425 -0.387 1.380 24.76 
uniondens overall 34.197 19.652 7.576 83.890 671 
 between  18.412 9.176 78.419 29 
 within  5.623 18.079 65.088 23.14 
socdemws overall 0.138 0.345 0 1 754 
 between  0.351 0 1 29 
 within  0 0.138 0.138 26 
eu overall 0.521 0.500 0 1 754 
 between  0.442 0 1 29 
 within  0.247 -0.440 1.252 26 
euage overall 14.451 18.915 0 59.000 754 
 between  18.492 0 46.500 29 
 within  5.212 1.951 26.951 26 
trade overall 79.205 47.298 15.924 319.554 737 
 between  44.658 21.865 237.797 29 
 within  17.069 12.278 160.962 25 
gdpintl overall 18510 2661 14120 23382 754 
 between  376 17681 19042 29 
 within  2635 14555 22903 26 
almpintl overall 0.694 0.093 0.489 0.909 754 
 between  0.022 0.636 0.719 29 
 within  0.091 0.501 0.897 26 
unempintl overall 7.492 0.840 5.618 9.218 754 
 between  0.116 7.114 7.652 29 
 within  0.833 5.688 9.117 26 
unempt-1 overall 7.437 3.927 1.500 23.900 676 
 between  3.297 3.012 16.272 29 
 within  2.305 -0.535 15.065 23 
gdpcap overall 18558 10581 2413 56285 739 
 between  10174 4458 41107 29 
 witihn  3559 1032 33737 26 
growth overall 2.647 3.002 -14.574 12.278 720 
 between  1.118 1.015 6.103 29 
 within  2.787 -14.358 10.710 25 
inflation overall 5.816 12.710 -6.382 208.175 720 
 between  6.304 -0.153 26.707 29 
  within   11.172 -18.733 190.509 24.83 
 
Social democratic welfare state is the only variable with zero within-variation, and therefore 
the only time-invariant variable. The social democratic welfare state dummy variable has a 
mean of 0.14, indicating that 14 percent of the countries in the data set are social democratic 
welfare states. All other variables vary over time, to a greater or lesser extent. In addition to 
social democratic welfare state, two dummy variables are included in the analysis: left-wing 
government and EU membership. All other variables are on a metric level. Forty-six percent 
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of the observations in the sample are governments with left-wing executives. Fifty-two 
percent of the observations represent EU member countries. The variable union density has an 
overall mean of 34.2, and a standard deviation of 19.7. The minimum and maximum values 
range between 7.6 and 83.9. Given that union density is a percentage measure of the share of 
wage earning union members of total wage earners, there is considerable variation in the 
variable. However, a large part of the variation is between countries (SD=18.4), not within 
countries (SD=5.6). This tells us that union density is almost time-constant, and therefore 
better able to explain between-country variation, than within-country variation. The same can 
be said about the trend variable age of EU membership, which counts the number of years a 
country has been a member of the EU. The standard deviation of EU membership age 
between countries is 18.5, and within countries it is 5.2. Although the variable increases with 
one unit every year for EU members, the greatest variation is between countries, not within. 
Social democratic welfare state is the only variable which is completely time-constant, but 
both union density and EU membership age can be interpreted as close to time-invariant. 
Trade, too, has more between-variation than within-variation, indicated by the standard 
deviations of 44.7 and 17.1. The lowest trade value 16 percent of GDP (Japan in 1993) and 
the maximum value is 320 percent of GDP (Luxembourg in 2007). The variables international 
GDP, international ALMP, international unemployment, growth and inflation have more 
variation within countries than between. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of national 
unemployment with one year lag, as used in the analysis. The average unemployment is 7.44 
percent. The lowest unemployment level observed is 1.5 percent (Luxembourg in 1992), and 
the highest level observed is 24 percent (Spain in 1995).  
5.4 Trade and border weighted matrices 
Two weight matrices are used to define the structure of dependence between countries: 
bilateral trade flows and shared borders. For the bilateral trade matrix, data is collected from 
the OECD’s “Trade in value by partner country” data (OECD.Stat 2012). Import and export 
values are added to get total trade volume, and the average across the time period 1985-2010 
is calculated. In an ideal situation, it would be possible to create 26 matrices with the 
corresponding bilateral trade values for every year of the period. However, because of missing 
data, this is not possible. According to the OECD data, some countries export and import to 
themselves, but in the analysis the diagonal is set to zero, which is common in spatial analyses 
using spatial weights (Franzese and Hays 2006). The matrix is row-standardized. However, it 
44 
 
is not inversed as commonly done to matrices based on distance. This is because for 
relationships defined by geographic distance between two regions, the smaller the distance is, 
the closer the relationship between them. Therefore, distance matrices are inversed to ease 
interpretation. When using trade, the relationship is the opposite: the higher the trade volume, 
the tighter the relationship between two countries. Thus, it is not necessary to inverse the 
matrix. The binary border matrix is coded relying on The World Factbook (CIA 2013-14). No 
country is considered neighboring itself (diagonal of zero) and countries with no neighbors 
are deleted from the analysis. Borders of the included countries are considered constant over 
the time period between 1985 and 2010.  
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6.0 Empirical analysis 
The thesis set out to identify the most influential constraints to the autonomy of ALMP 
decision-making, by taking a holistic approach to four broad categories of ALMP 
determinants: international political, international economic, domestic political and domestic 
economic. An important part of the analysis is to test the effect of policy diffusion, within the 
international political category of determinants. Therefore, the empirical analysis starts out by 
estimating Moran’s I values for relevant independent variables followed by spatial regression 
models. This is to find out if the values on the dependent variable are spatially clustered, and 
if spatial regression models are suited to model policy diffusion of ALMP. In the second part 
of the analysis, multilevel model estimations are fitted step by step to identify effects of 
various determinants of ALMP. Moran’s I values are calculated for the residuals of the full 
multilevel model, to be able to distinguish between direct and indirect diffusion effects of 
ALMP. Based on the full multilevel model, two sets of comparisons are done in order to 
decide whether political influences on ALMP are stronger than economic, and whether 
domestic predictors are more important than international. The final section of the chapter 
sums up main findings. A discussion of the results is presented in chapter seven. 
6.1 Spatial analysis  
The spatial part of the analysis aims to identify the degree and type of spatial dependence in 
ALMP. First, Moran’s I estimates of spatial dependence are calculated for the dependent 
variable and relevant independent variables. Then, spatial lag and spatial error regression 
models are estimated. Finally, the residuals of the final multilevel model are tested for spatial 
clustering using Moran’s I statistics. The spatial analysis is conducted using cross-section 
data. The data set is the aggregated average of the 1985-2010 panel data that is used in the 
later multilevel model.  
Moran’s I 
In Table 4 below, two sets of Moran’s I estimates are displayed. In the first column the 
dependence structure is defined as bilateral trade. Estimates of the second column are based  
46 
 
on the binary shared-border matrix
13
. P-values are based on two-tailed significance tests, 
because spatial correlations can be both negative (high, low), and positive (high, high; low, 
low).  
 
Table 4. Moran's I statistics 
 Weight: bilateral trade Weight: shared border 
 Moran's I P-value Moran's I P-value 
almp -0.036 0.990 0.397 0.014 
socdem -0.065 0.556 0.911 0.000 
inflation -0.068 0.514 0.026 0.692 
uniondens -0.081 0.364 0.657 0.000 
euage -0.136 0.048 0.614 0.000 
leftgov 0.011 0.356 0.449 0.008 
unempintl 0.010 0.366 0.112 0.382 
almpintl -0.041 0.912 0.379 0.020 
                   All p-values are based on two-tailed tests 
 
The Moran’s I statistic ranges from -1 to +1, where 0 is random dispersion, +1 is perfect 
positive spatial correlation, and -1 is perfect negative spatial correlation (Haining 2003: 75-
80). The estimates show that when weighted with bilateral trade, all variables have Moran’s I 
values close to zero. The only significant estimate is that of EU membership age (-0.14, 
p=0.05). In other words, there is no spatial correlation in the dependent variable, or in the 
majority of the independent variables, when the spatial structure between countries is defined 
by trade flows. However, spatial correlation is found when proximity is defined by 
geography, i.e., shared borders. The Moran’s I for ALMP is 0.40 with a p-value of 0.0114, 
which is a clear indication of a positive spatial pattern in ALMP (Ward and Gleditsch 2008: 
36). Figure 1 displays a scatterplot of the spatial correlation in the dependent variable, when 
weighted with shared borders. The ALMP variable is standardized and plotted against its 
spatial lag (Ward and Gleditsch 2008: 24-25). As shown by the fitted OLS regression line, 
countries with low ALMP values have neighbors with low values (low, low), while countries 
with higher ALMP values, also have neighbors with higher ALMP values (high, high). By 
                                                 
13
 For Moran’s I values weighted with shared borders, the countries Greece and Chile are excluded. In the data 
set, Greece and Chile have no neighbors and therefore represent rows of zeroes in the matrix. This causes trouble 
when trying to estimate spatial regression models and Moran’s I values. According to Ward and Gleditsch (2008: 
20), a way of dealing with the non-neighbor problem is to exclude those countries from the analysis. 
14
 Test is two-tailed because spatial correlation can be negative, as in the case of Franzese and Hays (2006). 
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comparing the clustering of observations around the fitted line in the lower left quadrant, to a 
higher dispersion toward the upper right quadrant, the graph indicates that the positive spatial 
correlation is stronger for lower values of ALMP.  
 
Figure 1. Moran's I scatterplot for standardized dependent variable and its spatial lag 
In regression models with ALMP as the dependent variable, the spatial correlation must be 
accounted for to avoid violating the assumption of independent residuals. Independent 
variables may be able to control for some of the spatial correlation in the dependent variable 
(Ward and Gleditsch 2008). As shown in Table 4, there are spatially correlated explanatory 
variables. All independent variables have positive Moran’s I values, but only social 
democratic welfare state, union density, EU membership age, left-wing government and 
international ALMP are significant (p<0.05). Social democratic welfare state is almost 
perfectly spatially correlated, with a Moran’s I value of 0.91. This is of course due to the fact 
that all social democratic welfare states are clustered in the Nordic countries. Union density, 
EU membership age and left-wing government have Moran’s I values of 0.66, 0.61 and 0.45, 
respectively. The spatial correlation of EU membership age is easily explained by the fact that 
EU members are clustered in Europe, while the sample includes countries from four 
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continents. There is no intuitive explanation for the spatial clustering of union density and 
left-wing government. The international ALMP variable, which measures the international 
ALMP trend minus country specific ALMP effort, is also spatially correlated. This is obvious, 
since the values on the dependent variable is spatially clustered.  
If explanatory variables can account for the spatial correlation in ALMP, it is likely that the 
spatial pattern is caused by diffusion of common contexts. In other words, that spatial 
correlation in ALMP is the result of policy-makers choosing the same policies as a response 
to the same needs (Braun and Gilardi 2006). To find out if this is true, the Moran’s I value is 
calculated for the residuals of the final multilevel model. But before examining if independent 
variables can account for spatial clustering in ALMP, the analysis proceeds by estimating two 
types of spatial regression models: spatial lag and spatial error.  
Spatial regression  
The Moran’s I estimates rejected the presence of spatial correlation, when using a weight 
matrix based on trade flows. The following spatial lag and spatial error models are therefore 
weighted with the binary border matrix. In the spatial lag model a spatially lagged dependent 
variable is added to the right side of the model, to control for first-order spatial correlation. 
The spatial error model is a so-called autoregressive model, which corrects for spatial 
correlation in the residuals. Those variables that prove significant in the multilevel model 
(Model 7) are included in the first step, while all non-significant variables are excluded in the 
second step (Table 5, below).  
Judging by the deviance, AIC and BIC statistics of the spatial lag model, the model excluding 
all non-significant variables (union density, inflation and international unemployment) is a 
better fit. The coefficient of left-wing government is positive (0.098), with a p-value of 0.07. 
Hence, left-wing governments have a positive effect on ALMP efforts. A country that changes 
from non-left to a left government will experience an increase in ALMP efforts of 0.098 
percentage points. The effect of social democratic welfare state is also positive and 
significant, 0.01. Countries changing to a social democratic welfare state will increase ALMP 
efforts by 0.273 percentage points.  
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Table 5. Spatial lag model, shared borders 
Step 1: Variables of multilevel Model 7 Step 2: Excluding insignificant variables 
almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value 
leftgov 0.071 0.059 0.228 leftgov 0.098 0.054 0.068 
socdemws 0.255 0.087 0.003 socdemws 0.273 0.075 0.000 
uniondens 0.001 0.001 0.353 uniondens    
eu 0.004 0.001 0.000 eu 0.004 0.001 0.000 
inflation 0.001 0.002 0.537 inflation    
almpintl -17.115 0.977 0.170 almpintl -17.395 0.899 0.000 
unempintl -0.155 0.113 0.000 unempintl    
_cons 13.573 0.969 0.000 _cons 12.626 0.635 0.000 
rho -0.152 0.064 0.017 rho -0.140 0.063 0.028 
Deviance -70 AIC -55 Deviance -73 AIC -59 
N 27 BIC -42 N 27 BIC -50 
All p-values are based on two-tailed tests 
 
The effect of average EU membership age is positive with a coefficient of 0.004 and 
significant (p<0.01). Theoretically this means that older EU members have higher ALMP 
levels. However, it does not really make sense to interpret this coefficient literally, because 
the variable measures the average age of EU membership between 1985 and 2010.  
Rho is the spatial lag parameter and measures the average influence of one country’s ALMP 
on neighboring countries’ ALMP. In the spatial lag model above, rho is negative, -0.14, and 
significant with a p-value of 0.03. In other words, there is evidence of negative spatial 
dependence in the dependent variable after controlling for the spatial effects of the 
explanatory variables. This means that if country A increases its ALMP efforts by one 
percentage point, neighboring countries will on average reduce their ALMP efforts by 0.140 
percentage points. The fact that rho is significant proves that the inclusion of the spatial lag of 
the dependent variable improves the models ability to account for differences in ALMP 
between countries (Ward and Gleditsch 2008). The LR-test of rho is significant, which means 
that the spatial lag model is a better fit than simple OLS. A significant rho value also means 
that if fitting an OLS regression using the same data set, the estimates would not be efficient.  
The negative spatial diffusion in ALMP is supported by the significant (p<0.01) and negative 
effect (-17.4) of international ALMP, which measures the average ALMP effort in percent of 
GDP of all foreign countries in the sample. In other words, one percentage point increase in 
the international ALMP level leads to a 17.4 percentage point decrease in the dependent 
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variable. The values of ALMP in the observed data
15
 range from 0.02 to 1.8 percent, which 
makes a reduction of 17.4 percentage points unrealistic. A more sensible description of the 
relationship between international ALMP and ALMP is to say that a 0.01 percentage point 
increase in international ALMP leads ALMP to decrease by 0.174 percentage points. The 
international ALMP level has a strong negative effect on domestic ALMP levels. These 
findings are consistent with Franzese and Hays’ (2006) theory that countries free-ride off each 
other’s ALMP. They find empirical evidence that the increase in worker-training programs in 
one country decreases equilibrium expenditures in neighbor countries. In practice this means 
that work seekers travel to a neighbor country where training programs are offered, 
whereupon they return to their home country more employable. At the same time, they have 
relieved their own government from offering ALMP. The results of the spatial lag model 
contrast the Moran’s I value of the dependent variable, which shows positive and significant 
spatial correlation. This discrepancy between the Moran’s I values and the negative value of 
rho in the model, is caused first by the spatially lagged dependent variable, and then by spatial 
clustering of the explanatory variables. The spatially lagged dependent variable may remove a 
large part of the spatial correlation, while the spatial clustering of the independent variables 
may cause the spatial correlation parameter rho to turn negative. However, as the spatial lag 
model is a simple model using a small data set, results might not be reliable. A more complex 
and more carefully specified model is needed to interpret spatial correlation in ALMP further. 
Before moving on to the multilevel models using panel data, a spatial error model is estimated 
to examine whether there are omitted variables causing spatial clustering in the error terms. 
In the spatial error model it is assumed that any spatial dependency comes from the error 
terms, as a result of factors and contexts that are not included in the model (Ward and 
Gleditsch 2008: 68). Table 6 shows the results of the spatial error model. Variables that are 
clearly insignificant in the first estimation are removed; the results of the second estimation 
are displayed in the right column.  
 
 
                                                 
15
 The average of ALMP between 1985 and 2010  
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Table 6. Spatial error model, shared borders 
Step 1: Variables of multilevel Model 7 Step 2: Excluding insignificant variables 
almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value 
leftgov -0.029 0.063 0.648 leftgov    
socdemws 0.141 0.080 0.078 socdemws 0.133 0.069 0.055 
uniondens 0.000 0.001 0.769 uniondens    
eu 0.004 0.001 0.002 eu 0.004 0.001 0.000 
inflation 0.004 0.002 0.036 inflation 0.003 0.002 0.043 
almpintl -19.020 0.652 0.000 almpintl -18.948 0.648 0.000 
unempintl -0.198 0.081 0.015 unempintl -0.193 0.082 0.000 
_cons 15.243 0.738 0.000 _cons 15.133 0.719 0.000 
lambda 0.652 0.144 0.000 lambda 0.634 0.146 0.000 
Deviance -78 AIC -58 Deviance -78 AIC -62 
N 27 BIC -45 N 27 BIC -52 
All p-values are based on two-tailed tests 
 
Lambda is the spatial correlation parameter in the spatial error model. A significant lambda 
coefficient means that the error terms are spatially correlated (Ward and Gleditsch 2008). The 
lambda coefficient is highly significant and positive, indicating that there is positive spatial 
dependence in the residuals caused by some unknown omitted variables. The LR-test is 
significant and proves that, in this case, a spatial error model is more appropriate than OLS 
regression. Contrary to the spatial lag model, left-wing government has no significant effect in 
the error model. However, inflation and international unemployment, which are not 
significant in the spatial lag model, are both significant at the five percent level in the error 
model. Inflation has a small positive effect with a coefficient of 0.003, while international 
unemployment has a negative effect (-0.193). Social democratic welfare state is positive 
(0.133) and significant (p=0.06), although the effect is slightly weaker than in the lag model. 
The effect of EU remains roughly the same, and so does the effect of international ALMP.  
Summary of findings: Spatial analysis 
The Moran’s I values and spatial parameters rho and lambda show clear evidence of spatial 
dependence. This supports the hypothesis that spatial policy diffusion is a determinant of 
ALMP. The Moran’s I value of the dependent variable shows positive spatial correlation in 
the dependent variable, the spatial error model shows positive spatial clustering in the error 
terms, but when estimating a spatial lag model including explanatory variables, the spatial 
dependence at lag one is negative. This might be a result of the spatially lagged dependent 
variable removing positive spatial correlation in the dependent variable, while independent 
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variables cause the spatial correlation to appear negative. This might be an indication of 
indirect diffusion, because independent variables are able to account for positive spatial 
correlation. In other words, external factors drive what appears to be direct policy diffusion of 
ALMP.  
Because the spatial models above are estimated using a data set of only 27 observations, 
caution should be maintained in the interpretation of the spatial diffusion parameters as well 
as the effects of explanatory variables. In order to better distinguish between direct and 
indirect diffusion of ALMP, and for a closer look at domestic and external predictors of 
ALMP, the next section explores the advantages of multilevel regression analysis applied on a 
larger data set containing 29 countries over a time period of 26 years. 
6.2 Multilevel model estimations 
The second part of the analysis uses multilevel regression analysis with random effects to test 
the importance of various determinants of ALMP. Following the final model, the role of 
autocorrelation in explaining path dependency is discussed, and the spatial clustering of the 
residuals is analyzed. Further, the relative influence of the two dimensions of constraints to 
policy autonomy: international – domestic, and political – economic, is tested and discussed, 
before a summary of findings is presented.  
Model 1: The null model, random intercepts 
Model 1 is the null model displayed in Table 7 below, contains only the intercept and 
variances within and between countries (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 316-17). The AIC 
and BIC for the null model are -758 and -751, respectively. The deviance is -766. Alone these 
parameters make no sense, but provide a reference for the goodness of fit, against which the 
next model can be compared. The intercept is the average ALMP effort across all 
observations, which is 0.62 percent of GDP. The country-level variance is 0.148 and the 
variance within countries is 0.58. The intra-class correlation is the country-level variance in 
proportion to total variance, which in this case is 72 percent. This indicates first that a large 
part of the variation in ALMP is due to between-country differences, and second, that 
autocorrelation is likely to be high. The latter is confirmed by the parameter rho (0.96), which 
gives the first-order autocorrelation in the residuals (Luke 2004). High degrees of 
autocorrelation can mean two things. First, there may be variables that are not controlled for, 
but should have been included. Second, high autocorrelation may be a sign of policy inertia 
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(Pierson 2004). However, autocorrelation is expected to decrease as independent variables 
and random coefficients are added to the model, therefore possible path dependency and 
policy stickiness (Pierson 2004) of ALMP will be discussed further following the final model. 
 
Table 7. Multilevel Model 1-2 
Model 1. Null model. Model 2. Domestic variables 
almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value 
_cons 0.621 0.077 0.000 _cons 0.312 0.125 0.013 
    leftgov -0.026 0.018 0.137 
    uniondens 0.010 0.004 0.005 
    unempt-1 0.013 0.007 0.067 
    gdpcap 0.000 0.000 0.351 
    growth -0.006 0.002 0.006 
    inflation -0.008 0.003 0.016 
Random part:     Random part:       
var(_cons) 0.583 0.048   var(_cons) 0.000 0.000   
var(_e) 0.148 0.062  var(_e) 0.143 0.035  
AR(1) rho 0.960 0.011   AR(1) rho 0.962 0.010   
Intra-class corr. 0.72 AIC -758 Intra-class corr. 1.00 AIC -799 
N 527 BIC -751 N 527 BIC -756 
Countries 29 Deviance -766 Countries 29 Deviance -819 
All p-values are based on two-tailed tests 
 
Model 2: Domestic time-varying variables, random intercepts 
In the second model, the domestic level one variables left-wing government, union density, 
GDP per capita, growth and inflation are added to the null model. The deviance statistic has 
decreased to -819, AIC has decreased to -799, and BIC to -756, which according to 
expectations, confirms that Model 2 is a better model. The within-country variance is now 
close to zero, whereas the country-level variance has decreased marginally from 0.148 to 
0.143. This may be due to the union density variable, which varies so little within countries 
that it becomes close to a time-invariant variable, contributing to explaining variance at the 
country-level. The autocorrelation parameter rho has a slight increase from 0.960 to 0.962. In 
other words, the variables added in Model 2, do not contribute to control for autocorrelation. 
The coefficient of GDP per capita is close to zero and is far from significant. It is therefore 
excluded from further estimations. Left-wing government is negative (-0.026) with a p-value 
of 0.14. Strictly, this does not entail significance, but because left-wing government is a 
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variable of interest, it is not excluded from the model at this point. Union density has a 
positive effect (0.010) on ALMP, and is significant (p<0.01). Unemployment at lag one is, as 
expected, also significant (p=0.07), with a positive coefficient (0.013). Growth has a negative 
effect (-0.006), everything else held equal, and the effect is significant (p<0.01). The effect of 
inflation is equally negative and significant (-0.008, p=0.02).  
Model 3: Domestic and international time-varying variables, random intercepts  
In Model 3, GDP per capita is excluded, and the following international determinants of 
ALMP are added: EU membership, EU membership age, international unemployment, 
exposure to trade, international GDP per capita, and international ALMP.  
 
Table 8. Multilevel Model 3-4 
Model 3. Dom. + intl. variables Model 4. Time-invariant variable 
almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value 
leftgov -0.022 0.015 0.136      
    socdemws 0.073 0.073 0.045 
uniondens 0.009 0.004 0.016 uniondens 0.007 0.004 0.073 
unempt-1 0.008 0.007 0.198      
growth -0.003 0.002 0.083      
inflation -0.006 0.003 0.019 inflation -0.006 0.003 0.029 
eu -0.101 0.084 0.229      
euage 0.011 0.003 0.000 euage 0.010 0.003 0.001 
unempintl 0.027 0.012 0.030 unempintl 0.033 0.012 0.007 
trade 0.000 0.001 0.794      
gdpintl 0.000 0.000 0.633      
almpintl 0.192 0.131 0.144 almpintl 0.273 0.131 0.037 
_cons -0.045 0.281 0.872 _cons -0.216 0.130 0.096 
Random part:     Random part:       
var(_cons) 0.000 -   var(_cons) 0.000 0.000   
var(_e) 0.114 0.037  var(_e) 0.100 0.077  
AR(1) rho 0.956 0.008   AR(1) rho 0.948 0.042   
Intra-class corr. 1.00 AIC -832 Intra-class corr. 1.00 AIC -832 
N 527 BIC -772 N 527 BIC -789 
Countries 29 Deviance -860 Countries 29 Deviance -852 
All p-values are based on two-tailed tests 
 
This leads the deviance to decrease further to -860, and the AIC and BIC to decrease to -832 
and -772. Model 3 is clearly a better fit than Model 2. Now, the within-country variance is 
zero. The between-country variance has decreased further to 0.114, although the standard 
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error is slightly higher than in Model 2. The autocorrelation in the residuals has decreased to 
0.956, a slight improvement compared to the null model.  
Left government has the same negative effect as in Model 2, but the effect is not significant 
(p=0.14). The hypothesis about a positive relationship between left-wing government and 
ALMP is therefore not supported. The unconditional effect of left-wing government is not 
found to be significant. The effect of EU membership is also not significant (p>0.1), 
undermining the hypothesis that EU membership has a positive effect on ALMP. However, 
the effect of EU membership age is significant (p<0.01), and positive (0.011). The effects of 
national unemployment, trade and international GDP per capita are not found significant 
(p>0.1). Therefore, the variables left-wing government, unemployment, EU membership, 
trade and international GDP will not be included in the next step. Union density is still 
positive with nearly the same strength as in Model 2 and the effect is significant with a p-
value of 0.02. Growth is negative with a p-value of 0.08. Inflation is still negative and 
significant (p=0.02). International unemployment is positive and significant (p=0.03). 
International ALMP is positive with a coefficient of 0.192, but it is not significant at the ten 
percent level. However, a p-value of 0.13 is not too far away from significance, so for the 
moment the variable is kept for further estimations.  
The hypothesis of the effect of economic globalization on ALMP, is tested with a collective 
test of the variables international GDP and trade. The chi-square test is not significant 
(p=0.78). Thus, the model does not find a significant effect of economic globalization on 
ALMP efforts.  
At this stage a Hausman test is conducted to test whether proceeding with a random effects 
model is sensible. The Hausman test, using the variables included in Model 3, shows that the 
difference in coefficients between random and fixed effects models is not systematic 
(Prob>chi
2
=0.52). Hence, a random effects model is preferred because it will produce more 
efficient estimates (Baum 2006: 230). By avoiding fixed effects it is also possible to include 
time-invariant variables (Allison 2009). 
Model 4: Adding social democratic welfare state, random intercepts 
In Model 4 the time-invariant variable social democratic welfare state is included and left-
wing government, unemployment, growth, trade, EU and international GDP are excluded due 
56 
 
to insignificance
16
. Now, the deviance is not relevant, because the third and fourth models are 
not nested. Therefore, only AIC and BIC are considered. AIC has decreased to -832 and BIC 
to -789. Autocorrelation is still high, but decreases further to 0.948. These are not large shifts, 
but Model 4 is simpler than Model 3 and therefore clearly a better model (see for example 
Luke 2004: 34; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 323). The within-variance remains close to 
zero, and the between-variance has decreased from 0.111 to 0.100, indicating that more of the 
between differences are accounted for in this model. This is due to the time-invariant social 
democratic welfare state variable. Social democratic welfare state has a positive (0.073) and 
significant (p=0.05) effect on ALMP. Its coefficient shows that countries with social 
democratic welfare states on average spend 0.073 percentage points more on ALMP in 
percent of GDP. The results of Model 4 support the hypothesis that social democratic welfare 
regimes have an effect on ALMP. The effect of union density is slightly weaker in Model 4, 
compared to Model 5. The coefficient, however, is still positive and significant with a p-value 
of 0.073. If union density increases with one percentage point, ALMP increases with 0.007 
percentage points. This may seem marginal, but considering that ALMP values range between 
0.01 and 3.04, the effect is worth noting. The results support the hypothesized positive 
relationship between union density and ALMP. International unemployment and international 
ALMP efforts also have positive effects, with p-values of 0.01 and 0.04, respectively. The 
effect of inflation is unchanged from Model 3 – negative and significant. 
The variables union density and social democratic welfare state are highly correlated, 0.79
17
. 
However, as noted by (Berry 1993: 27): “a nearly linear relationship among independent 
variables does not violate any assumption”. The problem may rather be that small changes in 
the model can lead to large fluctuations in coefficients, in addition to inflated standard errors 
(Midtbø 2012). However, as the estimation results of Models 4 through 7 show, the 
coefficients of social democratic welfare state and union density remain close to constant, 
with relatively small standard errors.  
                                                 
16
 Growth is significant in Model 3, but proved insignificant in Model 4, and is therefore removed for reasons of 
parsimony. 
17
 A bivariate correlation matrix (Table A-1, Appendix) shows that multicollinearity between the other 
independent variables is not alarming. 
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Model 5: Within-country interaction terms, random intercepts 
To test the conditional hypotheses H4
18
, H10
19
, H11
20
 and H13
21
, the fifth model includes 
interaction terms. Model 5a in Table 8 below shows that the interaction between left-wing 
government and union density is significant with a p-value of 0.06. The other interactions 
have coefficients close to zero and they are not significant (p>0.1). According to the estimates 
of Model 5a, exposure to trade given left-wing government does not have a significant effect 
on ALMP efforts. Neither does exposure to trade given strong unions. No evidence is found to 
support the hypothesis that the effect of international business cycles increases with exposure 
to trade. All interactions, except the one between left-wing government and union density, are 
excluded from further estimations due to their insignificant effects. 
Table 9. Multilevel Model 5 
Model 5a. Interactions. Model 5b. Only sig. interactions 
almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value   Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value 
leftgov 0.013 0.032 0.672 leftgov 0.054 0.036 0.130 
uniondens 0.014 0.008 0.069 uniondens 0.008 0.004 0.044 
leftgov*uniondens -0.002 0.001 0.063 leftgov*uniondens -0.002 0.001 0.072 
gdpintl 0.000 0.000 0.437 gdpintl    
trade 0.002 0.005 0.705 trade    
gdpintl*trade 0.000 0.000 0.991 gdpintl*trade   
trade*uniondens 0.000 0.000 0.116 trade*uniondens   
leftgov*trade 0.001 0.000 0.111 leftgov*trade   
socdemws 0.364 0.202 0.072 socdemws 0.382 0.195 0.051 
euage 0.011 0.003 0.000 euage 0.009 0.003 0.002 
almpintl 0.200 0.134 0.134 almpintl 0.263 0.124 0.035 
unempintl 0.030 0.013 0.020 unempintl 0.033 0.012 0.006 
inflation -0.006 0.003 0.028 inflation -0.006 0.003 0.028 
_cons -0.107 0.383 0.781 _cons -0.242 0.135 0.072 
Random part:       Random part:     
var(_cons) 0.000 0.000   var(_cons) 0.000 0.000   
var(_e) 0.096 0.398  var(_e) 0.103 0.106  
AR(1) rho 0.948 0.236   AR(1) rho 0.951 0.054   
Intra-class corr. 1.00 AIC -841 Intra-class corr. 1.00 AIC -842 
N 527 BIC -768 N 527 BIC -791 
Countries 29 Deviance -875 Countries 29 Deviance -866 
All p-values are based on two-tailed tests 
                                                 
18
 H4: Left-wing government given corporatism has a positive effect on ALMP efforts 
19
 H10: Exposure to trade given left-wing government has a positive effect on ALMP efforts 
20
 H11: Exposure to trade given strong unions has a positive effect on ALMP efforts 
21
 H13: The effect of international business cycles on ALMP efforts increases with exposure to trade 
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Model 5b shows the model output when insignificant interactions and their constitutive terms 
are excluded. Considering AIC, BIC and deviance statistics of Model 5a and Model 5b, it is 
not explicit that 5b is the better model. However, interaction terms severely complicate a 
model; when in doubt, a simpler model should be preferred over a complex one (see for 
example Luke 2004: 34; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 323). When comparing Model 5b 
to Model 4 – the only difference being the inclusion of the interaction between left-wing 
government and union density, and its constitutive variables – Model 5b provides a better fit. 
This is because AIC decreases from -832 in Model 4, to -842 in Model 5b; BIC decreases 
from -789 to -791; and the deviance statistic decreases to -866. In Model 5b, rho increases 
slightly to 0.951, but autocorrelation is still lower than in the null model.  
To facilitate the interpretation of the interaction between left-wing government and union 
density, marginal effects of left-wing government at different values of union density are 
calculated. The marginal effect of left-wing government for various values of union density is 
presented visually in Figure 2 below.  
 
Figure 2. Marginal effect of left-wing government at various values of union density 
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The effect of the interaction is significant at the five percent level for values of union density 
when both dotted lines are completely above or below the zero line. The coefficient of the 
interaction has a p-value of 0.07, while the graph is calculated with 95 percent confidence 
intervals. Thus the dotted lines are never both on the same side of zero. However, for trade 
union density values above 40, the marginal effect of left government is significant 
(0.05<p<0.1). As the graph shows, the effect of the interaction is positive for union density 
values below 25, but not significant. For union density values above 25, however, the 
interaction effect is negative, but not significant until trade union density reaches 40 percent. 
Approximately 30 percent of the observations in the sample have union density values above 
40 percent. The hypothesized positive relationship between left-wing government and ALMP 
given strong unions is rejected by the estimates of Model 5.  
The coefficient of the constitutive term union density is the effect of union density when left-
wing government is equal to zero. Setting left-wing government to zero makes sense – it only 
means that the chief executive party in government is non-left. The effect of union density 
when party in government is non-left is positive (0.008) and significant with a p-value of 
0.04.   
Model 6: Random coefficients 
In Model 6 the assumption that time-varying variables affect observations across countries 
equally, is relaxed. This means that coefficients are allowed to vary in both direction and 
strength between countries. Variables that previously have been excluded due to 
insignificance can now be included again as random effects, because “it is quite possible for 
an explanatory variable to have no significant average regression slope […], but have a 
significant variance component for this slope” (Hox 2010: 58). When including a random 
effect, the corresponding fixed slope must be included as well, because it rarely makes sense 
to expect varying effects of a variable while at the same time constraining its mean effect to 
zero (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008: 171).  
In complex models the inclusion of more than one random coefficient is demanding, and may 
cause the iteration process to break down if it fails to achieve convergence (Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2008: 172). Therefore, random coefficients are analyzed one by one. The random 
slope effects to be tested and examined are international GDP, left-wing government, EU 
membership age and international ALMP. The variable international GDP has no main effect 
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on ALMP, which may be due to the fact that the cross-country differences in effect are so 
great. The effect of international GDP levels can be expected to vary between countries, 
because countries are not equally exposed to international markets and the international 
economy. Some states are more vulnerable to international business cycles than others, thus 
the effect may vary accordingly (Dreher et al. 2008). The effect of left-wing government can 
also be expected to vary between countries. It is likely that there is political consensus on 
ALMP across the left and the right in some countries, whereas in others the left side support 
ALMP, whereas the political right side opposes active labor market policies. Janoski’s (1994: 
79-80) cross-national comparison of ALMP in the USA, West-Germany and Sweden finds 
that the effect of left-wing government varies between countries, depending on welfare 
regime. In Sweden, a social democratic welfare state, both the political left and right support 
ALMP. In the conservative welfare regime of West-Germany, ALMP is strongly driven by 
left-wing politics.  
EU membership age has a positive main effect on ALMP, confirming Armingeon’s (2007) 
theory that older EU members are better institutionalized and thus better equipped to 
successfully implement the relative complicated active labor market policies. Therefore, it is 
interesting to test what happens to the effect of EU membership age, when countries reach 
higher ALMP levels. Does the effect of EU hold for well-functioning welfare states outside 
the EU? Does the effect of EU membership age diminish with increasing ALMP efforts? The 
effect of international ALMP levels is expected to vary between countries, because some 
countries are more sensitive to international political influences than others. European 
countries, for example, might be more aware of each other’s policies than the USA is aware 
of international welfare trends. 
First, the random effects of international business cycles, left-wing government and EU 
membership age are discussed briefly. Finally, because the spatial policy diffusion effect on 
ALMP plays a central part in this thesis, the model including the random slope effect of 
international ALMP efforts will be examined more carefully. Model 7 includes a cross-level 
interaction term, in an attempt to explain why the effect of international ALMP varies 
between countries. 
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Table 10. Multilevel Model 6a-b 
Model 6a. Random slope effect: gdpintl   Model 6b. Random slope effect: leftgov 
almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value 
leftgov 0.058 0.037 0.116 leftgov 0.062 0.038 0.099 
uniondens 0.007 0.004 0.108 uniondens 0.009 0.004 0.034 
leftgov*uniondens -0.002 0.001 0.069 leftgov*uniondens -0.002 0.001 0.063 
socdemws 0.289 0.180 0.086 socdemws 0.374 0.190 0.048 
euage 0.009 0.003 0.000 euage 0.009 0.003 0.001 
almpintl 0.237 0.124 0.055 almpintl 0.261 0.126 0.038 
unempintl 0.030 0.012 0.027 unempintl 0.033 0.012 0.007 
inflation -0.006 0.003 0.031 inflation -0.006 0.002 0.022 
gdpintl 0.000 0.000 0.260      
_cons 0.087 0.312 0.780 _cons -0.260 0.135 0.055 
Random part:    Random part:    
var(gdpintl) 0.000 0.000   var(leftgov) 0.001 0.001   
var(_cons) 0.698 0.539  var(_cons) 0.025 0.012  
cov(gdpintl,_cons) 0.000 0.000  cov(leftgov,_cons) -0.006 0.003  
var(_e) 0.061 0.012  var(_e) 0.083 0.025  
AR(1) rho 0.920 0.021   AR(1) rho 0.940 0.010   
Intra-class corr. 0.08 AIC -849 Intra-class corr. 0.77 AIC -841 
N 527 BIC -785 N 527 BIC -781 
Countries 29 Deviance -879 Countries 29 Deviance -869 
All p-values are based on two-tailed tests 
 
International business cycles 
Even though the average slope effect of international GDP per capita is not significant, the 
LR-test shows that the variable has a significant variance component to the regression slope. 
Goodness-of-fit measures remain inconclusive on whether adding the random effect of 
international GDP yields a better model. The deviance and AIC statistics are both lower than 
in Model 5b, with values of -879 and -849, respectively, but the BIC has slightly increased to 
-785. The autocorrelation is smaller than in any of the previous models, with a rho value of 
0.92. By letting the effect of international business cycles vary between countries, the size of 
the between-variance component is reduced to 0.061, the intercepts variance has increased to 
0.70 and the variance of the slopes for international GDP is practically zero. The latter 
essentially means that there is no unexplained slope variance of international GDP. The 
covariance between intercepts and slopes is negative, but small: -3.02*10
-5
. In theory, this 
means that countries that spend more on ALMP are less influenced by international business 
cycles. However, because the covariance is so small, the effect is negligible. Considering that 
the fixed mean effect of international business cycles is zero and that the random slope effects 
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are minimal, there is no doubt that the hypothesized relationship between international 
business cycles and ALMP can be rejected.  
Left-wing government 
When the slope of left-wing government is allowed to vary between countries, the effects of 
explanatory variables remain the same: none of them change sign and the changes in strength 
are marginal. Compared to Model 5b between-country variance is reduced to 0.083, and the 
variance of the intercepts has increased to 0.025. The random slopes variance of left-wing 
government is 0.001. The covariance between slopes and intercepts is negative, -0.006, 
indicating that the effect of a left party in government decreases as countries increase their 
ALMP efforts. The formal LR-test shows that the random coefficient model with left 
government is preferred to the random intercept model. However, the changes in deviance, 
AIC and BIC are so small, that the random intercept Model 5b is be preferred over the model 
where left-wing government is allowed to vary between countries. The deviance decreases to 
-869, but the AIC increases to -841, and the BIC increases to -781. Autocorrelation is 0.94, 
which is somewhat lower than in Model 5b.  
 
Table 11. Multilevel Model 6c-d 
 Model 6c. Random slope effect: euage  Model 6d. Random slope effect: almpintl 
almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value 
leftgov 0.055 0.036 0.127 leftgov 0.051 0.033 0.123 
uniondens 0.008 0.004 0.033 uniondens 0.008 0.004 0.040 
leftgov*uniondens -0.002 0.001 0.072 leftgov*uniondens -0.002 0.001 0.064 
socdemws 0.321 0.174 0.066 socdemws 0.247 0.178 0.165 
euage 0.010 0.004 0.019 euage 0.009 0.003 0.001 
almpintl 0.267 0.125 0.033 almpintl 0.260 0.127 0.040 
unempintl 0.032 0.012 0.008 unempintl 0.031 0.012 0.010 
inflation -0.006 0.003 0.028 inflation -0.005 0.002 0.027 
_cons -0.218 0.131 0.096 _cons -0.196 0.123 0.112 
Random part:    Random part:    
var(euage) 0.000 0.000   var(almpintl) 0.163 0.088   
var(_cons) 0.038 0.059  var(_cons) 0.009 0.011  
cov(euage,_cons) -0.003 0.004  cov(almpintl,_cons) -0.038 0.032  
var(_e) 0.060 0.011  var(_e) 0.074 0.021  
AR(1) rho 0.918 0.027   AR(1) rho 0.934 0.008   
Intra-class corr. 0.61 AIC -846 Intra-class corr. 0.89 AIC -846 
N 527 BIC -786 N 527 BIC -786 
Countries 29 Deviance -874 Countries 29 Deviance -874 
All p-values are based on two-tailed tests 
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Age of EU membership  
EU membership age has a stable significant and positive main effect on ALMP in models 3 
through 5b. This means that older EU members will spend more money on ALMP than 
younger EU members. In Model 6c the random effect of EU membership age is estimated to 
test if the effect of EU membership age varies between countries. The LR-test against Model 
5b is significant, which indicates that the effect of EU membership age does vary significantly 
between countries. However, the goodness-of-fit statistics do not clearly state that Model 6c is 
a better fit than Model 5b. Autocorrelation in the residuals has decreased to 0.92, AIC 
decreases from -842 to -846, and the deviance decreases from -866 to -874. The BIC statistic, 
on the other hand, increases from -791 to -786. However, by letting the effect of EU 
membership age vary between countries, the between-variance is reduced from 0.103 to 
0.060. The variance of the intercepts increases to 0.038, while the variance of the slopes is 
zero. The covariance between intercepts and slopes is -0.003, indicating that the effect of EU 
membership age is reduced as countries increase their ALMP efforts.  
International ALMP efforts 
The effect of international ALMP efforts is significant in the random intercept model, but it 
also has a significant random slope effect. The LR-test is significant against the random 
intercept model with a p-value of 0.06. The deviance has decreased from Model 5 to -874, 
AIC has decreased to -846, and the BIC has increased a little to -786. Autocorrelation 
decreases to 0.93, which is lower than in the null model (0.96) and lower than in Model 5b 
(0.95). Concluding on these findings, the sixth model including variance components of 
international ALMP efforts is a better fit than the random intercept model. The between-
country variance has decreased to 0.074, the variance of the intercepts has increased from 
zero to 0.009, and the variance of the slopes is estimated to 0.163. The covariance of the 
intercepts and slopes is negative, -0.038, which can be interpreted to mean that countries 
become less influenced by international ALMP trends as they reach higher ALMP spending 
levels themselves. The main effects of the independent variables remain approximately the 
same, the exception is social democratic welfare state, which loses strength and its p-value 
increases from 0.043 to 0.159. The intra-class correlation of 0.89 indicates that 89 percent of 
the unexplained variation is at country level.  
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Model 7: Cross-level interaction, random coefficient 
Because the spatial policy diffusion effect on ALMP plays a central part in this thesis, the 
random slope of the policy variable international ALMP will be examined more carefully. In 
an attempt to explain the slope variance of international ALMP, the cross-level interaction 
term between international ALMP and the country-level predictor social democratic welfare 
state, is added to the model
22
.  
 
Table 12. Multilevel Model 7  
Model 7. Final model
23
 
almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value 
leftgov 0.050 0.032 0.120 
uniondens 0.008 0.004 0.040 
leftgov*uniondens -0.002 0.001 0.060 
socdemws -0.173 0.235 0.461 
socdemws*almpintl 0.893 0.353 0.011 
euage 0.009 0.003 0.001 
almpintl 0.109 0.146 0.454 
unempintl 0.033 0.012 0.007 
inflation -0.005 0.002 0.025 
_cons -0.127 0.104 0.226 
Random part:    
var(almpintl) 0.081 0.045   
var(_cons) 0.001 0.002  
cov(almpintl,_cons) -0.007 0.013  
var(_e) 0.073 0.025  
AR(1) rho 0.933 0.009   
Intra-class corr. 0.99 AIC -852 
N 527 BIC -788 
Countries 29 Deviance -882 
  All p-values are based on two-tailed tests 
 
                                                 
22
 To achieve convergence the maximum likelihood option difficult (Stata) is applied. This means that a 
different stepping algorithm in non-concave regions is used in the iteration process. 
23
 To ensure unbiased estimates, the outliers Norway, 1988; Sweden, 1990; 1994; and 1999 are diagnosed (see 
Figure A-1 in Appendix), using Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal’s (2012: 161) definition of outliers: standardized 
residuals of more than ±4. An outlying observation is only influential to estimates if it additionally represents a 
data point with leverage (Midtbø 2012). The identification of observations with leverage in multilevel analyses is 
complicated (Langford and Toby 1998), but the influence of outliers can be observed by removing them from the 
model. When excluding Norway, 1988; Sweden, 1990; 1994; and 1999, the estimates of Model 7 remain 
unchanged (see Table A-2 in Appendix). Hence, there are no influential observations causing biased estimates.   
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The interaction is significant with a p-value of 0.01, and the slope variance is reduced to 
0.081. The social democratic welfare state can account for some of the variation in slopes of 
international ALMP efforts, but not all. If we calculate the standard deviation (=root 
0.081=0.285) and compare it to the average international ALMP slope variance in Model 6 
(0.160), 0.285 is not exactly a small standard deviation. Model 7, which includes the cross-
level interaction, is still a better fit than Model 6d. The deviance, AIC and BIC statistics are 
all lower than in Model 6d: -882, -852, and -788, respectively. 
In the final model, the between-country variance is 0.073 – a minor reduction from Model 6d. 
The variance of the intercepts is reduced from 0.009 to 0.001. The autocorrelation parameter 
shows a slight reduction from 0.934 to 0.933. The intra-class correlation is now at 0.99, which 
means that almost all unexplained variation is variation at country level.  
Before proceeding to evaluate the effects of explanatory variables, the question of causality 
should be addressed. In Model 7, the variable of which ALMP is most likely to be both a 
cause and a consequence is international unemployment
24
. An increase in unemployment 
creates a rise in the demand for ALMP, while an increase in ALMP can be expected to lower 
unemployment. Therefore a Granger’s causality test (Granger 1969) is conducted to evaluate 
the direction of causality between ALMP and international unemployment
25
. The F-tests are 
significant in both directions, which is an indication of the expected circular causality. In 
other words, international unemployment is not completely exogenous, but as shown by Card 
et al. (2010), the effect of ALMP on unemployment is weak or even non-existent depending 
on type of program. Therefore, the dynamic relationship between ALMP and international 
unemployment is not likely to influence the robustness of the results. Also, the two variables 
are likely to have a stabilizing effect on each other.  
                                                 
24
 It is theoretically unlikely that ALMP has a causal effect on the variables left-wing government, union 
density, social democratic welfare state and age of EU membership. ALMP is a policy among hundreds of 
government policies; it would be an exaggeration of its importance to expect it to have an impact on the ideology 
of government. Union density, social democratic welfare regime and age of EU membership are institutional 
variables which are not likely to be influenced by single policy areas.  
25
 First, ALMP is regressed on four lags of itself and four lags of international unemployment, in addition to all 
other variables included in Model 7. Then, international unemployment is regressed on four lags of itself and 
four lags of ALMP, in addition to all other variables included in Model 7. F-tests of the respective lags are used 
to determine whether ALMP granger-causes international unemployment, or if international unemployment 
granger-causes ALMP (Worrall 2008: 245).  
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Now, let us take a closer look at the coefficients of explanatory variables. From Model 5b we 
know that the interaction between left-wing government and union density has a negative 
effect for union density values above 40 percent. The coefficient and significance of this 
interaction is essentially the same in Model 7. The interaction between social democratic 
welfare state and international ALMP, which contributes to explaining slope variance, has a 
coefficient of 0.893 and is significant with a p-value of 0.01. To aid the interpretation of the 
interaction, the marginal effect of social democratic welfare state is calculated for a range of 
international ALMP values and displayed graphically. Figure 3 shows this marginal effect 
with its 95 percent confidence intervals.  
 
Figure 3. Marginal effect of social democracy at various values of international ALMP 
The interaction effect is positive for international ALMP values above 0.2, but it is only 
significant (p<0.05) for values of international ALMP above 0.61. The effect of social 
democratic welfare state increases as international ALMP levels rise. To detect if this effect is 
actually observed in the sample, it can be useful to examine the proportion of observations 
that have international ALMP values above 0.61 (Brambor et al. 2006: 76). Eighty percent of 
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the observations in the sample fall within the range of significance. Interpreting the 
constitutive term social democratic welfare state makes no sense, as international ALMP is 
never zero. The coefficient of international ALMP is positive, 0.109, but not significant 
(p>0.1), which means that there is no effect of international ALMP levels in countries with 
non-social democratic welfare states. 
The effect of EU membership age is the same as in Model 6d, with a coefficient of 0.009 and 
a p-value below 0.01. Each additional year as member of the EU leads to an increase in 
ALMP efforts of 0.009 percentage points. This supports the hypothesis that EU membership 
age has a positive effect on ALMP. The longer a country has been an EU member, the higher 
its ALMP efforts. International unemployment also has a positive and significant effect on 
ALMP (p<0.01). When the international unemployment rate increases by one percentage 
point, ALMP increases by 0.03 percentage points. Inflation has a negative impact on ALMP. 
Its coefficient (-0.005) is significant with a p-value of 0.03, which means that a one 
percentage point rise in inflation will lead to a 0.005 drop in ALMP.  
The autocorrelation parameter rho is now 0.93, which, as expected, is a reduction from the 
null model. As mentioned above, high degrees of autocorrelation can be caused by both the 
failure to control for important variables and by path dependence of policy. With reference to 
a range of previous quantitative analyses of ALMP (Armingeon 2007; Bonoli 2010; Franzese 
and Hays 2006; Janoski 1994; Kemmerling 2006; Rueda 2006; van Vliet and Koster 2011) 
comparable to this study, and the reference to omitted variables in section 3.4, the chance of 
omitted variables being of importance in accounting for autocorrelation is not likely. Thus, 
chances are that ALMP suffers from path dependence.  
Autocorrelation and path dependence 
A path dependent process is essentially a self-reinforcing process where reversal or change 
becomes increasingly unattractive over time. The sequence of events is of great importance, 
and early events, known as critical junctures, are more influential for future outcomes, than 
later events (Pierson 2004). Leibrecht et al. (2011) argue that path dependence creates a lock-
in of the behavior of governments and citizens in the case of welfare provisions. When 
spending is generous, it is likely that citizens protest against cutbacks; when spending is tight, 
citizens are likely to vote against expansion because they fear the increased tax burden. This 
is what Clemens and Cook (1999: 458) describe when they claim that “formal political 
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institutions have great capacities for eliminating alternatives”. Usually, path dependency is 
used to refer to the built in status quo bias of institutions, also known as institutional 
stickiness, but according to Pierson (2004), the phenomenon applies to policy as well. There 
are two broad reasons why ALMP can be expected to be path dependent: the complexity of 
politics and the general preference of politicians to constrain the freedom of their successors. 
First, because politics are complex and opaque, trial-and-error processes of learning are 
difficult and far form automatic. Learning from errors of the past takes time (Pierson 2004). 
This is relevant for ALMP, because of the difficulty in measuring and evaluating its effects 
(Card et al. 2010). Second, policies are very often designed to be difficult to overturn, because 
politicians seek to bind their successors. Sometimes they are even willing to bind themselves 
to increase political trust (Pierson 2004). For instance, granting independence to central banks 
to secure macroeconomic stability. Even when politicians are not bound to ALMP by law, the 
durability effect of established policy might still be considerable. According to Rose (1991), 
policies are sticky because extensive policy arrangements fundamentally shape incentives and 
resources of political actors. Empirical evidence of ALMP developments across countries 
support the argument of path dependence, and demonstrates the importance of critical 
junctures in deciding future ALMP spending levels. According to Bonoli (2003), early 
developments of ALMP have locked countries into a specific policy path. The costs of 
shifting to alternatives increase due to normative views and incentive structures that 
encourage politicians to stay within the established path. ALMP was integrated into the 
Nordic welfare states in the 1960s, which were times of macroeconomic expansion. This 
provided favorable conditions for the institutionalization of ALMP. In contrast, the 
continental and Anglo-Saxon countries did not introduce ALMP until the mid-1980s, when 
the fiscal trend was dominated by belt-tightening (Armingeon 2007). Still today, the Nordic 
countries spend on average a larger share of GDP on ALMP, compared to the other members 
of the OECD (OECD.Stat 2011).  
Moran’s I of residuals   
The Moran’s I value of the residuals can be used to determine if there is spatial correlation in 
the residuals of the multilevel model. The Moran’s I value calculated for the residuals of 
Model 7 is -0.1 with a p-value of 0.74. In other words, the residuals of the final multilevel 
model are not spatially correlated. The scatter plot of the standardized residuals against 
spatially lagged residuals is shown in Figure 4 below.  
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Figure 4. Moran's I scatterplot of standardized residuals and its spatial lag 
The graph displays randomly distributed observations around the origin. This implies two 
things: First, the assumption of independent regression residuals is not violated, and the 
results of the final multilevel model are not affected by spatial clustering, i.e., estimates and 
standard errors are unbiased. Second, since there is evidence of spatial correlation in the 
dependent variable, but not in the residuals, the spatial dependence must have been eliminated 
by either 1) one or more explanatory variables (Ward and Gleditsch 2008); or 2) the temporal 
autoregressive residuals structure (Beck et al. 2006: 41). First, from the Moran’s I values 
weighted with shared borders in Table 4, we know that the explanatory variables social 
democratic welfare state, union density, EU membership age, left-wing government and 
international ALMP have positive spatial correlations. It is likely that the spatial diffusion 
pattern in ALMP is a result of spatial clustering of social democratic welfare states, union 
density or age of EU membership, and that these variables eliminate spatially correlated error 
terms. 
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Left-wing government does not have an unconditional significant effect on ALMP in Model 
7, and can therefore not be expected to contribute to the reduction of spatial correlation in the 
residuals. Since international ALMP is an aggregate of ALMP, it will logically explain a large 
part of the variation in ALMP. International ALMP will also have the same spatial structure 
as ALMP, and will therefore be partly responsible for the lack of spatial dependence in the 
residuals. The second possible reason for the lack of spatial dependence in the residuals has to 
do with autocorrelation. By controlling for first-order autocorrelation in the residuals, it is 
possible that some spatial correlation is accounted for as well. Beck et al. (2006: 41) show 
that spatial effects matter less in models where temporal effects are controlled for, because 
prior spatial effects are contained in the temporal effect.  
Comparing categories of constraints to policy autonomy 
Through the identification of the most important ALMP determinants, the goal of the analysis 
is to reach inference on the autonomy of policy. By comparing sets of variables, the relative 
importance of each dimension of constraints can be determined. This section aims to answer 
two of the questions formulated in the introduction of this thesis: Which factors are more 
important in explaining ALMP, domestic or international? Do economic factors matter more 
than political factors in explaining ALMP variation?  
First, the international-domestic dimension is considered. As an initial approach, it can be 
useful to look at the coefficients of the final model. Both domestic (union density, inflation, 
union density*left-wing government) and international (EU membership age, international 
unemployment) variables have significant effects, as well as the domestic international 
interaction of social democratic welfare state and international ALMP. It is impossible to 
determine the importance of either group just by looking at the coefficients and z-tests. 
Therefore a collective test is conducted on both domestic variables and international variables, 
respectively, but the results show that both groups contribute significantly to the model. To 
reach a conclusion, two new models are estimated: one including only international 
determinants, and another with only domestic variables. Since the models are not nested, AIC 
and BIC estimates are used to determine goodness-of-fit. Results are displayed in Table 13 
below. The information criterion estimates show that international variables are collectively 
more influential in explaining the variation in ALMP, than domestic variables.  
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Table 13. Comparing groups of variables 
  Domestic International Political  Economic 
almp Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
uniondens 0.011 0.016   0.008 0.058   
socdemws 0.182 0.431   0.424 0.033   
leftgov 0.060 0.107   0.054 0.149   
leftgov#uniond -0.002 0.060   -0.002 0.085   
euage   0.008 0.022 0.010 0.000   
inflation  -0.008 0.014      -0.006 0.020 
almpintl   0.298 0.023 0.560 0.000   
unempintl   0.038 0.004    0.050 0.000 
_cons 0.266 0.049 0.009 0.885 -0.233 0.113 0.268 0.000 
  Est. Rob. s.e. Est. Rob. s.e. Est. Rob. s.e. Est. Rob. s.e. 
var(_cons) 0.011 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.076 
var ( e ) 0.131 0.067 0.167 0.062 0.106 0.608 0.175 0.098 
AR(1) rho 0.958 0.017 0.968 0.004 0.950 0.310 0.970 0.013 
AIC -799   -806   -827   -806   
BIC -761  -776  -784  -781  
N 527  527  527  527  
     All p-values are based on two-tailed tests 
 
The same procedure is repeated in the comparison between political and economic variables. 
Both types are represented and significant in Model 7. Collective tests show that both types 
contribute significantly to improving the model. The AIC and BIC values of the separate 
models, however, show that political variables are collectively more important in explaining 
ALMP than economic variables. To make sure these results are reliable, an alternative method 
of comparing groups of variables – the Davidson-MacKinnon J-test (Davidson and 
MacKinnon 1981) – is conducted. For the J-test, the fitted values of the domestic model are 
included in the international model, and vice versa, and the fitted values of the political model 
are in included in the economic model, and vice versa. Results are displayed in Table 14 
below. The coefficients of the fitted values are significant at the five percent level in all four 
models. This means that none of the models include the right set of variables, and that the 
explanatory power of each model is improved when “opposite” variables are added. To 
determine the relative explanatory power of the variable groups, the fitted values coefficients 
are useful indications. In the domestic model, the fitted values of the international model have 
a coefficient of 0.923. In comparison, the domestic model fitted values have a coefficient of 
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0.888 in the international model. Both are significant (p<0.01), hence, the international 
variables have a stronger collective effect on ALMP, than domestic variables. 
Table 14. Davidson-MacKinnon J-test 
  Domestic International Political  Economic 
almp Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
uniondens 0.008 0.055   0.008 0.043   
socdemws 0.372 0.065   0.393 0.043   
leftgov 0.054 0.141   0.054 0.136   
leftgov#uniond -0.002 0.073   -0.002 0.075   
euage   0.009 0.004 0.009 0.001   
inflation  -0.006 0.022      -0.006 0.014 
almpintl   0.250 0.054 0.238 0.022   
unempintl   0.032 0.007    0.023 0.010 
fitted values*  0.923 0.000 0.888 0.004 0.729 0.001 0.842 0.000 
_cons -0.238 0.104 -0.480 0.011 -0.450 0.016   
  Est. Rob. s.e. Est. Rob. s.e. Est. Rob. s.e. Est. Rob. s.e. 
var(_cons) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
var ( e ) 0.106 0.717 0.108 0.034 0.103 0.029 0.106 0.031 
AR(1) rho 0.952 0.350 0.953 0.010 0.951 0.009 0.952 0.008 
N 527   527   527   527   
* Fitted values of opposite model 
     All p-values are based on two-tailed tests 
 
This is consistent with the AIC and BIC statistics above. The coefficient of the fitted values 
from the economic model is 0.729, while the coefficient of the political fitted values is 0.842. 
Again, p-values are under lower than 0.01. In other words, political variables have a stronger 
explanatory power than economic variables. This is also consistent with the AIC and BIC 
statistics above. It is therefore safe to say that international factors are more important in 
explaining ALMP than domestic, and that political factors are more important than economic. 
The importance of international variables over domestic in determining ALMP, concurs with 
the theories of Garrett (1998b) and de Haan and Plümper (2006). Garrett (1998b) argues that 
globalization, whether it be political or economic, compromises national policy autonomy of 
individual states. De Haan and Plümper (2006) concentrate on the impact of European 
integration, and theorize that increased political integration erodes domestic fiscal policy 
autonomy. Regarding the second dimension of influence, political-economic, the comparison 
above finds support for Janoski’s (1994) argument that political variables are more important 
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that socioeconomic, because of the discretionary nature of ALMP. In other words, ALMP 
does not automatically respond to international or national macroeconomic fluctuations.  
Summary of findings: Multilevel analysis 
The multilevel model analysis finds significant and positive effects of union density, social 
democratic welfare state, age of EU membership, international ALMP levels and international 
unemployment. The unconditional effect of left-wing government is not significant, but the 
interaction between left-wing government and union density is significant and negative. There 
is no significant effect of economic globalization, trade or international business cycles, with 
the exception of the positive effect of international unemployment. The interactive effects of 
left-wing government and trade, union density and trade or international business cycles and 
trade are of no significant effect. The control variables national unemployment and growth do 
not have significant effects on ALMP. However, before being excluded from further 
estimations, their coefficients had signs as theoretically expected: positive for unemployment 
and negative for growth. Inflation has a negative effect on ALMP. Random slope effects of 
EU membership age, left-wing government and international GDP are not found to contribute 
significantly to a better model fit. The random slope effect of international ALMP efforts, on 
the other hand, is found to be significant. The time-invariant social democratic welfare state 
variable contributes to explaining part of the slope variance of international ALMP efforts. 
The residuals of the full model are highly autocorrelated, which is evidence of the fact that 
ALMP is path dependent. A comparison of different variable groups shows that political 
factors are more important in determining ALMP than economic, and that international 
factors matter more than domestic factors. Although the dependent variable is spatially 
correlated, there is no spatial correlation in the residuals of Model 7. Thus, the estimates and 
standard errors of the final multilevel model are not biased.  
In order to get a better understanding of the implications of the empirical analysis, the next 
chapter provides a more in-depth discussion of the most important findings. The inferences 
drawn in this thesis are also compared to theory and to the results of previous studies.  
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7.0 Discussion of results 
The analysis of variation in ALMP aimed to test the degree of spatial dependence in ALMP, 
i.e., spatial policy diffusion, to distinguish between direct and indirect diffusion, and to 
determine which independent variables most successfully explain ALMP variation across 
OECD countries between 1985 and 2010. Moran’s I values, spatial lag and spatial error 
models show clearly that the ALMP variable is spatially correlated, which supports the 
hypothesis of policy diffusion being a determinant of ALMP. Values on the dependent 
variable in one country are associated with similar values in neighboring countries. The 
spatial parameters rho and lambda indicate that failing to control for spatial correlation leads 
to biased estimates and standard errors in cross-section analyses. However, the residuals of 
the multilevel panel model are not spatially clustered, even though spatial correlation is not 
actively controlled for. This means that independent variables successfully explain the spatial 
correlation in ALMP. An interpretation of these results is that the spatial pattern in ALMP is 
caused by indirect diffusion, and not direct diffusion. In other words, policy makers do not 
adopt each other’s policies through learning or competitive and cooperative interdependence 
(Gilardi 2010), but through the diffusion of common contexts or as similar reactions to similar 
needs (Braun and Gilardi 2006). The following discussion will first review variables 
identified by the multilevel analysis as important for explaining variation in ALMP and 
compare the effects found in this analysis to theory and findings of previous studies. The 
second part of the discussion will provide explanations for why direct diffusion of ALMP 
does not occur. The third section explains how diffusion of independent variables might cause 
spatial clustering of ALMP. Finally, the results are summarized and their implications for 
policy autonomy are discussed. 
7.1 Determinants of ALMP 
The analysis found significant effects of a range of determinants of ALMP across 29 OECD 
countries in the period 1985-2010. Table 15 gives an overview of evaluations of the 13 
hypotheses that were developed in the theory chapter.  
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Table 15. Evaluation of hypotheses 
Theory Variable Expectation Actual effect Evaluation 
Policy diffusion 
almpintl + spatial 
analysis 
H1: Policy diffusion is a determinant of 
ALMP variation 
Evidence of 
indirect 
diffusion 
Supported 
Left-wing party 
in government 
leftgov (dummy) 
H2: Left-wing governments have a 
positive effect on ALMP efforts  
Significant 
random slope 
effect 
Rejected 
Corporatism uniondens 
H3: Union density has a positive effect on 
ALMP efforts 
Positive and 
significant 
Supported 
Left government 
given 
corporatism  
leftgov*uniondens 
H4: Left-wing government given 
corporatism has a positive effect on 
ALMP efforts 
Negative and 
significant 
Rejected 
Social 
democratic 
welfare state 
socdemws (dummy) 
H5: Social democratic welfare regime has 
an effect on ALMP efforts  
Positive and 
significant 
Supported 
EU membership eu (dummy) 
H6: EU membership has a positive effect 
on ALMP efforts 
No significant 
effect 
Rejected 
EU membership 
age 
euage 
H7: Age of EU membership has a 
positive effect on ALMP efforts  
Positive and 
significant 
Supported 
Economic 
globalization 
gdpintlc and trade 
collectively 
H8: Economic globalization has an effect 
on ALMP efforts 
No significant 
effect 
Rejected 
Trade trade 
H9: Exposure to trade has an effect on 
ALMP efforts 
No significant 
effect 
Rejected 
Trade given left 
government 
trade*leftgov 
H10: Exposure to trade given left-wing 
government has a positive effect on 
ALMP efforts 
No significant 
effect 
Rejected 
Trade given 
corporatism 
trade*uniondens 
H11: Exposure to trade given strong 
unions has a positive effect on ALMP 
efforts 
No significant 
effect 
Rejected 
International 
business cycles 
gdpintlc 
H12: International business cycles have 
an effect on ALMP efforts 
Effect of fixed 
and random 
effect zero 
Rejected  
International 
business cycles 
in an open 
economy 
gdpintlc*trade 
H13: The effect of international business 
cycles on ALMP efforts increases with 
exposure to trade 
No significant 
effect 
Rejected 
The empirical analysis of this thesis has shown that international determinants are more 
important than domestic, and that political are more important than economic, in explaining 
ALMP variation. For a better understanding of what the results of these comparisons 
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implicate, the essential findings of the multilevel analyses can be divided into three points: 1) 
social democracy and left-wing politics; 2) international political pressure; and 3) domestic 
and international macroeconomic indicators.  
First, social democratic welfare regime and union density were found to have positive effects 
on ALMP. The results indicate that Esping-Andersen (1990) is correct about ALMP being a 
defining feature of social democracy. Jingjing et al. (2008) also find that the Nordic welfare 
model has a positive relationship to ALMP, which strengthens the results of this analysis. 
Corporatism, operationalized by union density, can be seen as a characteristic of social 
democracy (Mosley et al. 1998). The positive effect found in the multilevel analysis further 
supports Esping-Andersen’s (1990) theory, while rejecting Rueda’s (2006) insider-outsider 
model. This theory predicts that unions are likely to discourage ALMP efforts because of the 
increased competition for work, which leads to pressure on wages. The results found here, 
however, show the direct opposite, that unions are more likely to support ALMP. Left-wing 
government, on the other hand, has no effect at all on ALMP, and the interaction between 
union density and left-wing government is negative. Bonoli (2010), too, finds only weak or 
non-existent effects of left-wing governments. It may seem like a paradox that while social 
democracy is a positive predictor of ALMP, left-wing governments have no effect. However, 
when considering the path dependent nature of ALMP, proven by autocorrelation, it is quite 
obvious. Just like ALMP, both social democracy and corporatism are sticky phenomena 
favoring the status quo. Both variables provide good conditions for the institutionalization of 
ALMP. Even though political preferences regarding ALMP are diverging along the left-right 
dimension, the effect of ideological alternation is simply not relevant, compared to the 
institutional arrangements favoring or disfavoring ALMP. Alvarez et al. (1991) argue that the 
ability of the left to pursue desired policies is stronger when unions are stronger and better 
organized. The negative effect of the interaction between left-wing government and union 
density gives no support for this theory. Based on these findings, it is reasonable to argue that 
ALMP is a type of policy where there exists political consensus in a given country, irrelevant 
of current ideology of government. This argument is also supported by Bonoli’s (2010) study, 
which finds that institutional predictors have strong effects in interaction with existing labor-
market policies. 
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Regarding the second point, international political pressure, two determinants are relevant: the 
EU and international ALMP levels. First, the EU is expected to encourage countries to 
implement ALMP using soft power through the open method of coordination (Armingeon 
2007). Activation is motivated by the employment goals formulated in the European 
Employment Strategy, and van Vliet (2010) claim to find convergence on ALMP among EU 
members, as a direct consequence of the European Employment Strategy. According to this 
analysis, EU members do not spend more money on ALMP than non-members. The direct 
effect of the EU is therefore rejected. However, the empirical analysis of this thesis 
demonstrated that when considering the number of years a country has been an EU member, a 
positive effect on ALMP is found. This supports Armingeon’s (2007) theory that older 
members are more likely to implement ALMP, than less established members. This is because 
older members democratized earlier and have more complex and better institutionalized 
welfare systems. In other words, the effect of EU membership age might not have anything to 
do with activation pressure from the EU, but rather with the quality and extent of welfare 
institutions. Second, the analysis finds a positive effect of international ALMP efforts on 
national ALMP efforts. This can be interpreted to mean that governments look abroad to 
adjust own policies to international levels. However, because no evidence of neither learning 
nor competitive interdependence was found, it is more likely that what looks like appliance to 
an international trend is another sign of indirect diffusion. The coefficient of international 
ALMP efforts might just reflect the general trend of increased ALMP efforts, which has been 
evident since 1985 (Bonoli 2010). However, a trend per se, does not contribute to explain why 
ALMP increases.  
Finally, macroeconomic indicators, both international and domestic are found to be less 
important in explaining ALMP, than political variables. No effect is found of economic 
globalization, operationalized by exposure to trade and international business cycles. Both the 
efficiency and the compensation hypotheses (Dreher et al. 2008) are rejected. In other words, 
ALMP does not react to fluctuations in the international economy, which further supports the 
argument of ALMP being path dependent in nature. National unemployment has no effect on 
ALMP, which legitimates the choice of not including unemployment in the measure of ALMP 
like others have done before (Armingeon 2007; Scarpetta 1996; van Vliet 2010). International 
unemployment is found to have a positive effect on ALMP, as expected.  
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To summarize, ALMP variation can best be explained by institutional variables such as 
welfare regime and corporatism. Changing ideologies of governments are not found to be 
influential. A direct effect of recommendations to activate labor market policies from the EU 
is not found. However, it is evident that older EU members spend more money on ALMP, 
than younger members. This indicates that ALMP depends on a certain level of established 
welfare institutions. Finally, neither domestic nor international business cycles have an effect 
on ALMP. All of these findings support the argument that ALMP is path dependent. The next 
two sections explain why evidence of direct ALMP diffusion is not found, and elaborate on 
the probable causes of indirect diffusion.  
7.2 Why not direct diffusion?  
In this thesis, it has been argued that direct diffusion of ALMP is likely to occur first and 
foremost through the mechanism of learning, but also through competitive and cooperative 
interdependence. Because this analysis found no evidence of direct diffusion, this section 
attempts to explain why it did not, concentrating on the two direct diffusion mechanisms 
learning and competitive and cooperative interdependence. First, why do countries not learn 
from each other’s ALMP successes and failures? Casey and Gold (2005), who evaluated the 
attempt to encourage learning and diffusion of ALMP in the EU
26
, report that the two most 
common impediments to transfer is either 1) that programs are solutions to problems that do 
not exist in the home country, or 2) that that the effects of programs are unclear or 
unconvincing. Further, they developed three categories of constraints to learning based on the 
results of their evaluation: institutional, attitudinal and administrative-financial. First, the 
complexity of a country’s institutional arrangements may challenge the transfer of active 
labor market programs. Examples are diverging legal frameworks, social partnership 
constellations, social security systems, different tax systems or differing political structures. 
In some cases institutional divergences can require that a whole set of institutional 
arrangements are changed, in order for a specific labor market program to be transferable. The 
second hindrance to transfer is attitudinal. One example mentioned by Casey and Gold 
(2005), is the Swedish program for female entrepreneurship, which was turned down by 
Belgian, Greek, Portuguese and Spanish reviewers, because attitudes toward working women 
                                                 
26
 Whilst they found evidence of policy convergence on certain employment goals, they found no evidence of 
neither systematic learning, nor diffusion of ALMP. Learning does take place in the form of information 
exchange, but it does not result in the transfer of policy (Casey and Gold 2005).  
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in the mentioned countries would undermine any attempt to adopt a similar program. Third, 
administrative and financial constraints may also be impediments to the transfer of programs, 
for example in cases where the appropriate administrative body is lacking, or where resources 
are scarce and the cost burdens are too high for a government to bear.  
In line with the findings of Casey and Gold (2005), Kemmerling (2006) argues that 
institutional interdependence within countries is one explanation for the absence of learning. 
He also mentions path dependence as a second reason. As explained in chapter six, early 
ALMP developments are likely to lock policy into a specific path, which makes changing 
course seem hard, costly and unattractive for politicians.  
Another reason why this analysis shows no sign of direct spatial diffusion may be the 
definition of the spatial dependence structure. Learning does not require geographic 
proximity, but rather cultural, demographic or linguistic (Franzese and Hays 2006). The same 
explanation is valid for the second mechanism of diffusion, cooperative or competitive 
interdependence (Braun and Gilardi 2006). Competition for investment or mobile capital does 
not require countries to be neighbors, but it does require common economic ties (Franzese and 
Hays 2006). Because the structure of dependence in this analysis is geographic, it is not 
surprising that diffusion through economic competition is not found.  
The quantitative analysis finds no direct diffusion of ALMP when the spatial dependence 
structure is defined by geographic proximity. Even though the values on the dependent 
variable ALMP are spatially clustered, the multilevel model successfully controls for spatial 
correlation in the residuals. As explained above, neither learning nor economic competition 
causes direct diffusion. To understand why ALMP is geographically clustered, even though 
governments do not directly influence each other’s labor market policies, it is necessary to 
examine independent variables as reasons for indirect diffusion.  
7.3 Causes of indirect diffusion  
Since direct policy diffusion is rejected, the spatial pattern of ALMP may be driven by spatial 
correlations in domestic or external international determinants, i.e., indirect diffusion 
(Franzese and Hays 2006). The evaluation of encouraged learning by Casey and Gold (2005: 
37) provides good reason to believe that indirect diffusion is a relevant determinant of ALMP: 
“[…] the extent to which they [ALMP] offer any opportunity for transfer was judged in terms 
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of whether they fitted into the framework of institutions and financing systems that prevailed 
in the reviewer’s country”. In other words, a precondition for direct diffusion is that 
institutions are somewhat similar. If institutional characteristics diffuse across countries, the 
probability that policy will diffuse as well, increases.  
By examining the Moran’s I values of the independent variables, it is possible to get an 
indication of which variables are most likely to account for the spatial correlation in ALMP. 
Judging from Table 3 in section 6.1, it is clear that the political independent variables social 
democratic welfare state, union density, EU membership age, left-wing government and 
international ALMP efforts are all positively spatially correlated, with significant Moran’s I 
values. Some of these variables may in various ways facilitate the spatial diffusion of ALMP. 
Especially social democratic welfare regime and corporatism are likely to cause policy 
diffusion. Both variables are geographically clustered and entail some degree of common 
institutional structures. The same goes for EU membership, which is also geographically 
clustered. However, as discussed in section 7.1, the effect of EU membership is ambiguous. 
Left-wing government is not found to have any direct effect on ALMP, and will therefore 
neither be able to influence its spatial pattern. International ALMP efforts are simply a 
reflection of the general trend to increase ALMP across countries, but it does not explain why 
ALMP efforts cluster geographically. The economic variables inflation and international 
unemployment are not spatially clustered, which shows that the spatial pattern of ALMP is 
not a result of macroeconomic factors; neither domestic, nor international. This finding 
supports the evidence that political variables are more influential in explaining variation in 
ALMP. As pointed out by Janoski (1994), ALMP is not an automatic response to 
macroeconomic fluctuations. Thus, the variables that are most likely to cause indirect 
diffusion of ALMP are social democratic welfare regimes, union density and possibly EU 
membership.  
7.4 Summary: Policy autonomy  
The analysis was motivated by the need to uncover the constraints to national autonomy of 
active labor market policy. To evaluate the autonomy of national politicians in deciding on 
ALMP, it is useful to review the four categories of constraints identified in the introductory 
chapter: 1) domestic economic, 2) domestic political, 3) international economic, and 4) 
international political.  
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As discussed above, the analysis finds little or no effect of neither domestic, nor international 
economic factors on ALMP. Thus, economy in general is not a constraint to policy autonomy. 
International political factors include EU membership and policy diffusion effects. An impact 
of EU membership per se is not found, but the age of EU membership has a positive effect on 
ALMP. However, as Armingeon (2007) points out, older EU members are likely to have 
better institutionalized welfare systems, which is a precondition for ALMP, than younger 
members. In other words, the positive effect of EU membership age is likely to reflect the 
effectiveness of welfare systems, which de facto is a domestic determinant. Indirect diffusion 
is found to influence ALMP, through the diffusion of the independent variables social 
democratic welfare state and union density. This demonstrates that international political 
pressure is not found to constrain national policy autonomy. The remaining category of 
constraints that needs to be discussed is the domestic political category. As the empirical 
analysis and the discussion above have demonstrated, type of welfare state and union density 
are influential in determining ALMP. However, unlike what one would expect, the effect of 
left-wing government is not significant. From these findings it is reasonable to argue that 
institutions matter more than the shifting ideologies of governments. The empirical analysis 
provide solid evidence that ALMP is path dependent, which can be interpreted as learning 
within states, in contrast to between-state learning, as suggested by policy diffusion. 
Politicians are likely to stick to a specific policy path, using history as their guide to future 
decisions on ALMP. Paul Sacks argues that within-state learning “implies that elements 
within the state, acting, presumably, in pursuit of the national interest decide what to do 
without serious opposition from external actors” (Hall 1993: 276). A conclusion that can be 
drawn from the discussion is that policy autonomy of ALMP is compromised for elected 
politicians in the short run, but in the long run path dependence ensures the freedom from 
economic constraints, both internal and external, and freedom from external political pressure.  
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8.0 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to explain variation in ALMP expenditures across 29 OECD 
countries between 1985 and 2010. To answer the research question, spatial and multilevel 
analyses explored policy diffusion processes of ALMP, in addition to identifying the most 
important determinants of ALMP variation. The analysis found a spatial pattern of ALMP 
when defining the relationship between countries by geographic proximity. But, what appears 
to be a pattern of diffusion in the dependent variable is likely to be a result of the spatially 
clustered explanatory variables social democratic welfare regime, union density, and possibly 
EU membership. Key determinants of ALMP variation are social democratic welfare state, 
union density and age of EU membership. Macroeconomic variables are not found to impact 
the variation in ALMP. This may explain why no sign of neither direct nor indirect diffusion 
was identified when using trade flows to define spatial proximity. Further, the analysis shows 
that ALMP is strongly path dependent, which constrains the autonomy of elected politicians 
in the short run, but ensures freedom from external pressure in the long run. 
One should be very cautious about generalizing inferences drawn here, to other policy areas. 
However, as exposed by the discussion of diffusion processes above, the direct adoption of 
policy between governments is not as straight forward as the literature might indicate. As 
such, the findings of this thesis may have implications for future research on policy diffusion 
in general, by demonstrating that scholars should pay close to attention to the distinction 
between direct and indirect processes of diffusion.  
The thesis makes two main contributions to the literature. First, the holistic approach to 
comparing constraints to policy autonomy is new in the field of research focused on 
explaining ALMP variation. Second, the analysis adds to the policy diffusion literature by 
highlighting the importance of differentiating between direct and indirect diffusion, and by 
testing diffusion using a non-geographic weight structure.  
Nevertheless, this analysis only touches upon a field of political science, where potential 
research questions are far from exhausted. Three approaches to the further exploration of the 
variation in ALMP are suggested: 1) examining temporal lags of diffusion; 2) decomposing 
the dependent variable; and 3) studying the dynamic effects between causes and consequences 
of ALMP.  
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First, by improving the data availability of ALMP, or using multiple imputations to resolve 
the problem of missing values, it is possible to conduct spatial analyses of every year in the 
panel data, and not just of the 26-year average. This will improve robustness of results 
considerably. Better data availability also facilitates the evaluation of temporal lags of spatial 
diffusion effects, which can improve knowledge of diffusion effects and mechanisms.  
Second, the dependent variable in this analysis is operationalized as total ALMP spending in 
percent of GDP, which covers all types of active program. However, ALMP is not one 
singular program, but a whole arrangement of different initiatives, which popularity differ by 
country (Bonoli 2010). By splitting up the dependent variable into the different program 
categories, it is possible to examine how determinants influence the various programs 
differently. This may give further insights into variation patterns of ALMP, but also 
inferences on which types of programs that are more likely to diffuse across borders.   
Third, because this study treats ALMP as the dependent variable, it has not dealt with the 
effectiveness of these policies in reducing unemployment. In recent years, economists have 
made considerable efforts toward this matter, but results remain inconclusive. They 
acknowledge that some types of programs are more successful than others, but direct effects 
on unemployment are hard to pinpoint (Card et al. 2010; Dar and Tzannatos 1999; Kluve et 
al. 2007; Martin 2000; Stephan 2008). From a political science perspective, an interesting 
topic for further research is the dynamic between effects and diffusion of ALMP. As pointed 
out by Casey and Gold (2005), a large impediment to direct diffusion, i.e., learning, is the lack 
of conviction that programs have made an impact elsewhere. Meseguer (2006), likewise, 
argues that actors choose policies depending on effectiveness. By first studying the effects of 
the various programs at various lags, the conclusions drawn can be used to predict diffusion 
of ALMP through learning. In other words, identifying the programs that are most likely to be 
successful in reducing unemployment, and then testing their effect on ALMP diffusion, may 
produce results that are useful to both scholars interested in mechanisms of policy diffusion, 
and to organizations like the OECD and the EU when encouraging convergence of political 
best-practices across member states.  
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Appendix: Correlation matrix and outlier diagnostics  
Table A-1. Correlation matrix   
Correlation matrix. Variables of Model 7       
  leftgov uniondens socdemws euage almpintl unempintl inflation 
leftgov 1             
uniondens -0.02 1 
     socdemws 0.03 0.79 1 
    euage -0.27 0.03 -0.12 1 
   almpintl 0.07 0.01 -0.13 -0.21 1 
  unempintl 0.05 0.12 0.01 -0.10 0.72 1 
 inflation 0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -0.20 0.22 0.09 1 
 
 
 
Figure A-1. Scatterplot of standardized residuals against linear prediction of Model 7  
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Table A-2. Final model, excluding outliers  
Model 7. Excluding outliers  
almp Coef. Rob. s.e. P-value 
leftgov 0.037 0.024 0.123 
uniondens 0.007 0.003 0.041 
leftgov*uniondens -0.001 0.001 0.039 
socdemws -0.196 0.237 0.409 
socdemws*almpintl 0.951 0.366 0.009 
euage 0.009 0.003 0.000 
almpintl 0.155 0.135 0.252 
unempintl 0.028 0.011 0.013 
inflation -0.005 0.002 0.015 
_cons -0.108 0.100 0.283 
Random part: 
  var(almpintl) 0.087 0.045   
var(_cons) 0.001 0.003 
 cov(almpintl,_cons) -0.009 0.014 
 var(_e) 0.072 0.023 
 AR(1) rho 0.938 0.008   
Intra-class corr. 0.99 AIC -883 
N 523 BIC -819 
Countries 29 Deviance -913 
All p-values are based on two-tailed tests 
 
